ASME 58.22 2014
$98.04
ASME 58.22 – 2014 Requirements for Low Power and Shutdown Probabilistic Risk Assessment
| Published By | Publication Date | Number of Pages |
| ASME | 2014 | 299 |
None
PDF Catalog
| PDF Pages | PDF Title |
|---|---|
| 1 | ANS/ASME-58-22-201X |
| 3 | CONTENTS Foreword iv Preparation of Technical Inquiries To The Joint Committee On Nuclear Risk Management viii Committee Rosters x Part 1 GENERAL REQUIREMENTS FOR AN LPSD PRA AND QLRA 1 Section 1.1 Introduction 1 Section1.2 Acronyms and Definitions 13 Section 1.3 LPSD Quantitative Risk Assessment Applications Process 19 Section 1.4 LPSD PRA Technical Requirements 24 Section 1.5 LPSD PRA Configuration Control 26 Section1.6 LPSD PRA Peer Review 27 Part 2 PLANT OPERATING STATE ANALYSIS 32 Section 2.1 Overview of POS Analysis for LPSD PRA 32 Section 2.2 High Level and Supporting Requirements for the POS Analysis 34 Nonmandatory Appendix 2.A Plant Operating State Analysis Methodology for LPSD PRA 42 Part 3 REQUIREMENTS FOR INTERNAL EVENTS LPSD PRA 54 Section 3.1 Overview of Internal Events LPSD PRA Requirements 54 Section 3.2 Internal Events LPSD PRA Technical Elements and Requirements 54 Section 3.3 Peer Review for Internal Events LPSD PRA 120 Nonmandatory Appendix 3.A Risk Metric Calculation Methodology 124 Part 4 REQUIREMENTS FOR INTERNAL FLOODS FOR LPSD (LIF) 136 Section 4.1 Overview of Internal Flood PRA Requirements for LPSD 136 Section 4.2 Internal Flood PRA Technical Elements and Requirements 136 Section 4.3 Peer Review for Internal Flood PRA during LPSD 145 Part 5 SEISMIC ANALYSIS 146 Section 5.1 Overview of Seismic PRA Requirements during LPSD Conditions 146 Section 5.2 Technical Requirements for Seismic PRA during LPSD Conditions 146 Section 5.3 Peer Review for Seismic PRA during LPSD Conditions 153 Section 5.4 References 153 |
| 4 | Part 6 REQUIREMENTS FOR SCREENING AND CONSERVATIVE ANALYSIS OF OTHER EXTERNAL HAZARDS DURING LPSD CONDITIONS 154 Section 6.1 Approach for Screening and Conservative Analysis for Other External Hazards during LPSD Conditions 154 Section 6.2 Technical Requirements for Screening and Conservative Analysis of Other External Hazards during LPSD Conditions 155 Section 6.3 Peer Review for Screening and Conservative Analysis of Other External Hazards during LPSD Conditions 156 Section 6.4 References 156 Part 7 HIGH WIND ANALYSIS 157 Section 7.1 Overview of High Wind PRA Requirements during LPSD Conditions 157 Section 7.2 Technical Requirements for High Wind PRA during LPSD Conditions 157 Section 7.3 Peer Review for High Wind PRA during LPSD Conditions 161 Section 7.4 References 161 Part 8 EXTERNAL FLOOD ANALYSIS 162 Section 8.1 Overview of External Flood PRA Requirements during LPSD Conditions 162 Section 8.2 Technical Requirements for External Flood PRA during LPSD Conditions 162 Section 8.3 Peer Review for External Flood PRA during LPSD Conditions 165 Section 8.4 References 165 Part 9 OTHER EXTERNAL HAZARDS ANALYSIS 166 Section 9.1 Overview of Requirements for Other External Hazards PRAs during LPSD Conditions 166 Section 9.2 Technical Requirements for Other External Hazard PRA during LPSD Conditions 166 Section 9.3 Peer Review for Other External Hazard PRA during LPSD Conditions 169 Section 9.4 References 169 Part 10 LPSD QUANTATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT FOR A SPECIFIC LPSD EVOLUTION 170 Section 10.1 Overview of Risk Assessment for a Specific LPSD Evolution 170 Section 10.2 Supporting Requirements for Time-Dependent Risk Metrics for a Specific LPSD Evolution 170 Part 11 SHUTDOWN QUALITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT 231 Section 11.1 Overview of Qualitative Risk Assessment (QLRA) Requirements 231 Section 11.2 Risk Assessment Technical Requirements 237 Section 11.3 Peer Review 270 |
| 5 | Nonmandatory Appendix 11.A Shutdown QLRA Methodology 275 Part 12 REFERENCES 283 |
| 6 | FOREWORD |
| 12 | CONTRIBUTORS TO THE REQUIREMENTS FOR LOW POWER AND SHUTDOWN PROBABILISTIC RISK ASSESSMENT |
| 135 | (a) accident sequence model for a loss of RHR cooling while at reduced inventory; (b) the accident sequence model containing LOOP/Station Blackout considerations; (c) accident sequence model for a loss of a support system initiating event; (d) LOCA accident sequence model, especially for human-induced LOCAs; (e) ISLOCA accident sequence model; (f) the SGTR accident sequence model (for PWRs only); (g) reactivity insertions accident sequence model; (h) cold overpressure-induced accident sequence model. (a) the definition of core damage used in the success criteria evaluations and the supporting bases; (b) the conditions corresponding to a safe, stable state; (c) the core and containment response conditions used in defining LERF and supporting bases; |
| 136 | (d) the core and containment system success criteria used in the LPSD PRA for mitigating each modeled initiating event; (e) the generic bases (including assumptions) used to establish the success criteria of systems credited in the LPSD PRA and the applicability to the modeled plant for each POS; (f) the plant-specific bases (including assumptions) used to establish the system success criteria of systems for each POS credited in the LPSD PRA; (g) calculations performed specifically for the LPSD PRA for each computer code used to establish core cooling or decay heat removal success criteria and accident sequence timing; (h) calculations performed specifically for the LPSD PRA for each computer code used to establish support system success criteria (e.g., a room heat-up calculation used to establish room cooling requirements or a load shedding evaluation used to deter… (i) expert judgments used in establishing success criteria used in the LPSD PRA. (a) different models reflecting different levels of analysis detail; (b) front-line system for each mitigating function (e.g., reactivity control, coolant injection, and decay heat removal); (c) each major type of support system (e.g., electrical power, cooling water, instrument air, and HVAC); (d) complex systems with variable success criteria (e.g., a cooling water system requiring different numbers of pumps for success dependent upon whether non-safety loads are isolated). (a) the selection and implementation of any screening HEPs used in the PRA; (b) post-accident HFEs and associated HEPs; (c) pre-initiator HFEs and associated HEPs for both instrumentation miscalibration and failure of equipment; (d) at-initiator human failure events and associated HEPs; (e) HEPs for the same function but under the influence of different PSFs, including for different POSs; (f) HEPs for dependent human actions, including dependencies of multiple HEPs in the same sequence; (g) HEPs less than 1 × 10-4; (h) HFEs and associated HEPs involving remote actions in harsh environments; (i) the selection and identification of the HFEs associated with the HEPs for the above review topics. |
| 137 | (a) data values and associated component boundary definitions for component failure modes (including those with high importance values) contributing to the CDF or LERF calculated in the LPSD PRA; (b) common cause failure values; (c) the numerator and denominator for one data value for each major failure mode (e.g., failure to start, failure to run, and test and maintenance unavailabilities); (d) equipment repair and recovery data; (e) the influence of POS on all of the above. (a) appropriateness of the computer codes used in the quantification; (b) the truncation values and process to quantify each POS and aggregate; (c) the recovery analysis; (d) model asymmetries and sensitivity studies; (e) the process for generating modules (if used); (f) logic flags (if used); (g) the solution of logic loops (if appropriate); (h) the summary and interpretation of results. (a) accident characteristics chosen for carryover to LERF analysis (and for binning of PDSs if PDS methods were used); (b) interface mechanism used; (c) CDF carryover. (a) the LERF analysis method; (b) demonstration that the phenomena that impact radionuclide release characterization of LERF have been appropriately considered for each POS; (c) human action and system success considering adverse conditions that would exist following core damage; (d) the sequence mapping; (e) evaluation of containment performance under severe accident conditions including conditions when the equipment hatch is initially removed or partially bolted; (f) the definition and bases for LERF; |
| 138 | (g) inclusion in the containment event tree of the function events necessary to achieve a safe stable containment end state; (h) sensitivity analysis; (i) the containment response calculations performed specifically for the LPSD PRA, for the significant sequences and plant damage states (if PDS methods are used), and for each POS. (a) a review of the plant evolutions selected; (b) the attributes used to define the set of POSs; (c) the set of POSs and their attributes for each selected plant evolution, including decay heat levels, frequencies, and durations; (d) the process of screening out and grouping POSs for analysis; (e) a review to determine if the set of POSs supports the analysis of all hazard groups and that the POS grouping schemes do not mask significant contributors. |
| 160 | (a) internal flood event frequencies; (b) internal flood scenarios involving each identified flood source; (c) internal flood scenarios involving flood propagation to adjacent flood areas; (d) internal flood scenarios that involve each of the flood-induced component failure mechanisms (i.e., one flood scenario for each mechanism); (e) one internal flood scenario involving each type of identified accident initiator, e.g., transient and LOCA. |
| 285 | This section is analogous to Section 1.6, which applies to LPSD PRAs. |
