BS EN 16590-2:2014
$189.07
Tractors and machinery for agriculture and forestry. Safety-related parts of control systems – Concept phase
| Published By | Publication Date | Number of Pages |
| BSI | 2014 | 48 |
This part of EN 16590 specifies the concept phase of the development of safety-related parts of control systems (SRP/CS) on tractors used in agriculture and forestry, and on self-propelled ride-on machines and mounted, semi-mounted and trailed machines used in agriculture. It can also be applied to municipal equipment (e.g. street-sweeping machines). It specifies the characteristics and categories required of SRP/CS for carrying out their safety functions.
This part of EN 16590 is applicable to the safety-related parts of electrical/electronic/programmable electronic systems (E/E/PES), as these relate to mechatronic systems. It does not specify which safety functions, categories or performance levels are to be used for particular machines.
Machine specific standards (type-C standards) can identify performance levels and/or categories or they should be determined by the manufacturer of the machine based on risk assessment.
It is not applicable to non-E/E/PES systems (e.g. hydraulic, mechanic or pneumatic).
PDF Catalog
| PDF Pages | PDF Title |
|---|---|
| 7 | Foreword |
| 8 | Introduction |
| 10 | 1 Scope 2 Normative references 3 Terms and definitions 4 Abbreviated terms |
| 11 | 5 Concept — Unit of observation 5.1 Objectives 5.2 Prerequisites 5.3 Requirements 5.3.1 Unit of observation and ambient conditions |
| 12 | 5.3.2 Limits of unit of observation and its interfaces with other units of observation 5.3.3 Sources of stress 5.3.4 Additional determinations |
| 13 | 5.4 Work products 6 Risk analysis and method description 6.1 Objectives 6.2 Prerequisites 6.3 Requirements 6.3.1 Procedures for preparing a risk analysis 6.3.2 Tasks in risk analysis 6.3.3 Participants in risk analysis 6.3.4 Assessment and classification of a potential harm |
| 14 | Table 1 — Examples of the descriptions of injuries 6.3.5 Assessment of exposure in the situation observed Table 2 — Exposure to the hazardous event 6.3.6 Assessment of a possible avoidance of harm |
| 15 | Table 3 — Possible avoidance of harm 6.3.7 Selecting the required AgPLr |
| 16 | Figure 1 — Determination of AgPLr |
| 17 | 6.4 Work products 7 System design 7.1 Objectives 7.2 Prerequisites 7.3 Requirements 7.3.1 Assignment of AgPL |
| 18 | Figure 2 — Relationship between agricultural performance level, categories, DC, MTTFdC and SRL 7.3.2 Achieving the required AgPLr |
| 19 | Figure 3 — Diagram of combination of safety-related parts 7.3.3 Achievement of the performance level 7.4 Work products |
| 20 | Annex A (normative) Designated architectures for SRP/CS A.1 General A.2 Category B (basic) |
| 21 | A.3 Category 1 A.4 Category 2 Figure A.1 — Designated architecture for category 2 |
| 22 | A.5 Category 3 |
| 23 | Figure A.2 — Designated architecture for category 3 |
| 24 | A.6 Category 4 Figure A.3 — Designated architecture for category 4 |
| 26 | Annex B (informative) Simplified method to estimate channel MTTFdC B.1 General B.2 Component MTTFd values B.2.1 Determination of component MTTFd values |
| 27 | B.2.2 MTTFd for components from B10 B.3 Parts count method |
| 28 | Table B.1 — Example MTTFdC calculation of circuit board B.4 Calculation of symmetric MTTFdC for two-channel architectures |
| 29 | Annex C (informative) Determination of diagnostic coverage (DC) C.1 General C.2 Estimation of the required DC Table C.1 — Electrical subsystems (without micro-controllers) Table C.2 — Electronic subsystems (with micro-controllers) |
| 30 | Table C.3 — Processing units Table C.4 — Invariable memory ranges Table C.5 — Variable memory ranges Table C.6 — I/O units and interface (external communication) |
| 31 | Table C.7 — Power supply (applies to system with and without micro-controllers) C.3 Estimation of channel DC Table C.8 — Estimated DC |
| 32 | C.4 Calculation of channel DC C.5 Calculation of DC Table C.9 — Calculated DC |
| 33 | Annex D (informative) Estimates for common-cause failure (CCF) Table D.1 — Scoring process for measures against CCF |
| 34 | Table D.2 — Quantifying common-cause failure |
| 35 | Annex E (informative) Systematic failure E.1 General E.2 Procedure for the control of systematic failures E.3 Procedure for the avoidance of systematic failures |
| 38 | Annex F (informative) Characteristics of safety functions F.1 General F.2 Start interlock F.3 Stop function F.4 Manual reset |
| 39 | F.5 Start and restart F.6 Response time F.7 Safety-related parameters F.8 External control function F.9 Muting (manual suspension of safety functions) F.10 Operator warning |
| 40 | Annex G (informative) Example of a risk analysis G.1 Workflow G.2 Example risk analysis of an electro-hydraulic transmission for a self-propelled working machine (forage harvester) — Extract from a complete risk analysis G.2.1 System description |
| 41 | Figure G.1 — Principal structure of the drive train G.2.2 Surrounding conditions G.2.3 System states and transitions |
| 42 | Figure G.2 — State flowchart G.2.4 System failures |
| 43 | G.3 Assessment G.3.1 System failure — Stops unintentionally Table G.1 — System failure — Stops unintentionally Table G.2 — Scenario 1 |
| 44 | Table G.3 — Scenario 2 G.3.2 System failure — Does not move when commanded G.4 Results |
| 45 | Annex ZA (informative) Relationship between this European Standard and the Essential Requirements of EU Machinery Directive 2006/42/EC |
| 46 | Bibliography |
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BS EN 16590-2:2014
Tractors and machinery for agriculture and forestry. Safety-related parts of control systems – Concept phase…
