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BS EN IEC 61784-3-3:2021

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Industrial communication networks. Profiles – Functional safety fieldbuses. Additional specifications for CPF 3

Published By Publication Date Number of Pages
BSI 2021 152
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PDF Catalog

PDF Pages PDF Title
2 undefined
5 Annex ZA(normative)Normative references to international publicationswith their corresponding European publications
7 English
CONTENTS
14 FOREWORD
16 Figures
Figure 1 – Relationships of IEC 617843 with other standards (machinery)
17 Figure 2 – Relationships of IEC 617843 with other standards (process)
19 1 Scope
2 Normative references
21 3 Terms, definitions, symbols, abbreviated terms and conventions
3.1 Terms and definitions
3.1.1 Common terms and definitions
27 3.1.2 CPF 3: Additional terms and definitions
32 3.2 Symbols and abbreviated terms
3.2.1 Common symbols and abbreviated terms
33 3.2.2 CPF 3: Additional symbols and abbreviated terms
34 3.3 Conventions
4 Overview of FSCP 3/1 (PROFIsafe™)
35 Figure 3 – Basic communication preconditions for FSCP 3/1
Figure 4 – Structure of an FSCP 3/1 safety PDU
36 Figure 5 – Safety communication on CPF 3
37 5 General
5.1 External documents providing specifications for the profile
5.2 Safety functional requirements
5.3 Safety measures
38 5.4 Safety communication layer structure
5.4.1 Principle of FSCP 3/1 safety communications
Tables
Table 1 – Deployed measures to master errors
39 Figure 6 – Standard CPF 3 transmission system
40 5.4.2 CPF 3 communication structures
Figure 7 – Safety layer architecture
Figure 8 – Basic communication layers
41 Figure 9 – Crossing network borders with routers
42 5.5 Relationships with FAL (and DLL, PhL)
5.5.1 Device model
Figure 10 – Complete safety transmission paths
43 5.5.2 Application and communication relationships
5.5.3 Data types
Figure 11 – IO Device model
Table 2 – Data types for FSCP 3/1
Table 3 – F_MessageTrailer for FSCP 3/1
44 6 Safety communication layer services
6.1 F-Host driver services
Figure 12 – FSCP 3/1 communication structure
45 Figure 13 – F application interface of F-Host driver instances
46 Figure 14 – Motivation for “Channel-related Passivation”
48 6.2 F-Device driver services
Figure 15 – F-Device driver interfaces
50 6.3 Diagnosis
6.3.1 Safety alarm generation
6.3.2 F-(Sub)Module safety layer diagnosis
Table 4 – Safety layer diagnosis messages
51 7 Safety communication layer protocol
7.1 Safety PDU format
7.1.1 Safety PDU structure
Table 5 – Buffer entry on CRC2 error
52 7.1.2 Safety IO data
7.1.3 Status and Control Byte
Figure 16 – Safety PDU for CPF 3
Figure 17 – Status Byte
53 Figure 18 – Control Byte
54 7.1.4 (Virtual) MonitoringNumber
Figure 19 – The Toggle Bit function
55 7.1.5 (Virtual) MNR mechanism (F_CRC_Seed=0)
7.1.6 (Virtual) MNR mechanism (F_CRC_Seed=1)
Figure 20 – MonitoringNumber integration
Table 6 – MonitoringNumber of an F-Host driver SPDU
Table 7 – MonitoringNumber of an F-Device driver SPDU
56 Table 8 – MonitoringNumber of an F-Host driver SPDU
Table 9 – MonitoringNumber of an F-Device driver SPDU
57 7.1.7 CRC2 Signature (F_CRC_Seed=0)
Figure 21 – F-Host driver CRC2 signature generation (F_CRC_Seed=0)
58 7.1.8 CRC2 Signature (F_CRC_Seed=1)
Figure 22 – Details of the CRC2 signature calculation (F_CRC_Seed=0)
Figure 23 – CRC2 signature calculation (F_CRC_Seed=1)
59 7.1.9 Non-safety IO data
7.2 FSCP 3/1 behavior
7.2.1 General
Figure 24 – Details of the CRC2 signature calculation (F_CRC_Seed=1)
Figure 25 – Safety layer communication relationship
60 7.2.2 F-Host driver state diagram
Figure 26 – F-Host driver state diagram
Table 10 – Definition of terms used in F-Host driver state diagram
61 Table 11 – F-Host driver states and transitions
63 7.2.3 F-Device driver state diagram
64 Figure 27 – F-Device driver state diagram
Table 12 – Definition of terms used in Figure 27
65 Table 13 – F-Device driver states and transitions
67 7.2.4 F-Device driver restart
7.2.5 Sequence diagrams
68 Figure 28 – Interaction F-Host driver / F-Device driver during start-up
69 Figure 29 – Interaction F-Host driver / F-Device driver during F-Host power off > on
70 Figure 30 – Interaction F-Host driver / F-Device driver with delayed power on
71 Figure 31 – Interaction F-Host driver / F-Device driver during power off → on
72 Figure 32 – Interaction while F-Host driver recognizes CRC error
73 Figure 33 – Interaction while F-Device driver recognizes CRC error
74 7.2.6 Timing diagram for a MonitoringNumber reset
7.2.7 Monitoring of safety times
Figure 34 – Impact of the MNR reset signal
75 Figure 35 – Monitoring the message transit time F-Host ↔ F-(Sub)Module
76 Table 14 – SIL monitor times
77 7.3 Reaction in the event of a malfunction
7.3.1 Corruption of safety data
7.3.2 Unintended repetition
Figure 36 – Extended watchdog time on request
78 7.3.3 Incorrect sequence
7.3.4 Loss
7.3.5 Unacceptable delay
7.3.6 Insertion
7.3.7 Masquerade
7.3.8 Addressing
79 7.3.9 Out-of-sequence
7.3.10 Loop-back
7.3.11 Network boundaries and router
80 7.4 F-Startup and parameter change at runtime
7.4.1 Standard startup procedure
8 Safety communication layer management
8.1 F-Parameter
8.1.1 Summary
Table 15 – Safety network boundaries
81 8.1.2 F_Source/Destination_Address (Codename)
Table 16 – Codename octet order
82 8.1.3 F_WD_Time (F-Watchdog time)
8.1.4 F_WD_Time_2 (secondary F-Watchdog time)
8.1.5 F_Prm_Flag1 (Parameters for the safety layer management)
Figure 37 – Effect of F_WD_Time_2
83 Figure 38 – F_Prm_Flag1
Figure 39 – F_Check_iPar
Figure 40 – F_SIL
84 Figure 41 – F_CRC_Length
Figure 42 – F_CRC_Seed
Table 17 – Allowed combinations of F_CRC_Seed and F_Passivation
85 8.1.6 F_Prm_Flag2 (Parameters for the safety layer management)
Figure 43 – F_Prm_Flag2
Figure 44 – F_Passivation
Figure 45 – F_Block_ID
86 8.1.7 F_iPar_CRC (value of iPar_CRC across iParameters)
8.1.8 F_Par_CRC calculation (across F-Parameters)
Figure 46 – F_Par_Version
87 8.1.9 Structure of the F-Parameter record data object
8.2 iParameter and iPar_CRC
Figure 47 – F-Parameter
88 8.3 Safety parameterization
8.3.1 Objectives
Figure 48 – iParameter block
89 8.3.2 GSDL and GSDML safety extensions
Table 18 – GSDL keywords for F-Parameters and F-IO structures
90 Figure 49 – F-Parameter extension within the GSDML specification
91 8.3.3 Securing safety parameters and GSD data
Figure 50 – F_Par_CRC signature including iPar_CRC
92 Table 19 – Algorithm to build CRC0
93 Table 20 – GSD example in GSDL notation
94 Table 21 – GSD example in GSDML notation
Table 22 – Serialized octet stream for the examples
95 8.4 Safety configuration
8.4.1 Order of IO data types
8.4.2 Securing the safety IO data description
Table 23 – Order of IO data types
96 8.4.3 DataItem data type section examples
Table 24 – IO data structure items
97 Table 25 – DataItem section for F_IN_OUT_1
Table 26 – DATA_STRUCTURE_CRC for F_IN_OUT_1
98 Table 27 – DataItem section for F_IN_OUT_2
Table 28 – DATA_STRUCTURE_CRC for F_IN_OUT_2
99 Table 29 – DataItem section for F_IN_OUT_5
Table 30 – DATA_STRUCTURE_CRC for F_IN_OUT_5
100 8.5 Data type information usage
8.5.1 F-Host Channel driver
Table 31 – DataItem section for F_IN_OUT_6
Table 32 – DATA_STRUCTURE_CRC for F_IN_OUT_6
101 8.5.2 Rules for standard F-Host Channel drivers
Figure 51 – F-Host Channel driver as “glue”between F-(Sub)Module and application program
Table 33 – Sample F-Host Channel drivers
102 8.5.3 Recommendations for the use of F-Host Channel drivers
Figure 52 – Layout example of an F-Host Channel driver
103 8.6 Safety parameter assignment mechanisms
8.6.1 F-Parameter assignment
8.6.2 General iParameter assignment
8.6.3 System integration requirements for iParameterization tools
Figure 53 – F-Parameter assignment for F-(Sub)Modules
104 Figure 54 – System integration of CPD-Tools
Table 34 – Requirements for iParameterization
105 8.6.4 iPar-Server
Figure 55 – iPar-Server mechanism (commissioning)
107 Figure 56 – iPar-Server mechanism (for example F-(Sub)Module replacement)
108 Figure 57 – iPar-Server request coding (“status model”)
109 Figure 58 – Coding of SR_Type
Table 35 – Specifier for the iPar-Server Request
110 Figure 59 – iPar-Server request coding (“alarm model”)
111 Table 36 – Structure of the Read_RES_PDU (“read record”)
Table 37 – Structure of the Write_REQ_PDU (“write record”)
Table 38 – Structure of the Pull_RES_PDU (“Pull”)
112 Table 39 – Structure of the Push_REQ_PDU (“Push”)
113 Figure 60 – iPar-Server state diagram
114 Table 40 – iPar-Server states and transitions
115 Table 41 – iPar-Server management measures
116 9 System requirements
9.1 Indicators and switches
9.2 Installation guidelines
9.3 Safety function response time
9.3.1 Model
117 Figure 61 – Example safety function with a critical response time path
Figure 62 – Simplified typical response time model
118 9.3.2 Calculation and optimization
Figure 63 – Frequency distributions of typical response times of the model
119 Figure 64 – Context of delay times and watchdog times
120 9.3.3 Adjustment of watchdog times for FSCP 3/1
Figure 65 – Timing sections forming the FSCP 3/1 F_WD_Time
121 9.3.4 Engineering tool support
9.3.5 Retries (repetition of messages)
Figure 66 – Frequency distribution of response times with message retries
122 9.4 Duration of demands
9.5 Constraints for the calculation of system characteristics
9.5.1 Probabilistic considerations
Figure 67 – Residual error probabilities for the 24-bit CRC polynomial
123 Figure 68 – Residual error probabilities for the 32-bit CRC polynomial
124 9.5.2 Safety related assumptions
Figure 69 – Monitoring of corrupted messages
Table 42 – Definition of terms in Figure 69
125 9.5.3 Non safety related constraints (availability)
9.6 Maintenance
9.6.1 F-(Sub)Module commissioning / replacement
9.6.2 Identification and maintenance functions
126 9.7 Safety manual
Table 43 – Information to be included in the safety manual
127 9.8 Wireless transmission channels
9.8.1 Black channel approach
9.8.2 Availability
9.8.3 Security measures
9.8.4 Stationary and mobile applications
128 9.9 Relationship between functional safety and security
9.10 Conformance classes
Table 44 – F-Host conformance class requirements
129 Table 45 – Main characteristics of protocol versions
Table 46 – F-Host driver / F-Device driver conformance matrix
130 10 Assessment
10.1 Safety policy
10.2 Obligations
131 Annex A (informative) Additional informationfor functional safety communication profiles of CPF 3
Figure A.1 – Typical “C” procedure of a cyclic redundancy check
132 Table A.1 – The table “Crctab24” for 24 bit CRC signature calculations
133 Table A.2 – The table “Crctab32” for 32 bit CRC signature calculations
134 Table A.3 – The table “Crctab16” for 16 bit CRC signature calculations
135 Table A.4 – Values of CN_incrNR_64 and MNR for F-Host PDU
136 Annex B (informative) Information for assessment of the functional safety communication profiles of CPF 3
137 Annex C (normative) Optional features
Figure C.1 – F-Host driver application interface with feature Reaction on Device_Fault
138 Table C.1 – Definition of additional terms used in driver transitions
Table C.2 – F-Host driver transitions – added with reaction on Device_Fault
140 Table C.3 – Prevent unintentional restart by application measures
141 Figure C.2 – F-Host driver application interface with feature Disable F-(Sub)Module
Figure C.3 – Timing diagram to use Disable F-(Sub)Module
142 Table C.4 – F-Host driver transitions – with feature Disable F-(Sub)Module
144 Table C.5 – F-Host driver transitions – added with “reaction on Device_Fault”and “Disable F-(Sub)Module”
148 Bibliography
BS EN IEC 61784-3-3:2021
$215.11