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IEEE 2851-2023

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IEEE Standard for Functional Safety Data Format for Interoperability within the Dependability Lifecycle (Approved Draft)

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IEEE 2023 183
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New IEEE Standard – Active. A dependability lifecycle of products with focus on interoperable activities related to functional safety and its interactions with reliability, security, operational safety and time determinism are defined in this standard. The standard also describes methods, description languages, data models, and database schema that have been identified as necessary or critical, to enable the exchange/interoperability of data across all steps of the lifecycle encompassing activities executed at intellectual property (IP), system-on-chip (SoC), system and item levels, in a way that allows integration in different application domains such as automotive, industrial, medical and avionics safety critical systems.

PDF Catalog

PDF Pages PDF Title
1 Front cover
2 Title page
4 Important Notices and Disclaimers Concerning IEEE Standards Documents
8 Participants
10 Introduction
17 Contents
19 List of Figures
20 List of Tables
21 1. Overview
1.1 Scope
1.2 Purpose
1.3 Word usage
22 2. Normative references
3. Definitions, acronyms, and abbreviations
3.1 Definitions
24 3.2 Acronyms and abbreviations
26 4. Dependability management
4.1 Objectives
4.2 Requirements and recommendations
4.2.1 Dependability management process
4.2.2 Product impact analysis—ME, DB
27 4.2.2.1 Product impact analysis—ME
4.2.2.2 Product impact analysis—DB
4.2.3 Development interface agreement (DIA)—DL
4.2.4 Software tools—ME, DB
28 4.2.4.1 Software tools—DB
4.2.4.2 Software tools—ME
4.2.5 Monitoring of parameters for prognostics—DB
4.2.6 Tailoring of dependability activities—ME, DL, DB
29 4.2.6.1 Tailoring of dependability activities—ME
4.2.6.2 Tailoring of dependability activities—DL
4.2.6.3 Tailoring of dependability activities—DB
4.2.7 Dependability case—DB
4.2.8 Confirmation reviews—ME
30 4.2.9 Dependability audit—ME
4.2.10 Dependability assessment—ME
31 4.2.11 Release for production—DB
5. Product definition
5.1 Objectives
32 5.2 General
5.3 Inputs
5.4 Requirements and recommendations
5.4.1 User story, user feature, and addressable market
5.4.2 System/life profile—DL, DB
33 5.4.2.1 System/life profile—DL
5.4.2.2 System/life profile—DB
5.4.3 Hardware/software/system triggering conditions—DB
5.4.4 Operating situations and operating modes—DL, ME
5.4.4.1 Operating situations and operating modes—DL
34 5.4.4.2 Operating situations and operating modes—ME
5.4.5 Item interdependency—DL
5.4.6 External measures for safety and security—DL, DB
5.4.6.1 External measures for safety and security—DL
5.4.6.2 External measures for safety and security—DB
35 5.4.7 System level considerations for enabling deterministic performance—DB
5.4.8 Operating situations, operating modes, performance metrics, and dynamic conditions—DB
5.4.9 Environment use—DB
36 6. Generic requirements elicitation process of dependability lifecycle
6.1 Objectives
6.2 General
6.3 Inputs
6.4 Requirements and recommendations
6.4.1 Safety requirements—ME, DL
37 6.4.1.1 Safety requirements—ME
6.4.1.2 Safety requirements—DL
6.4.2 Concept—DL
6.4.3 Risk level/ automotive safety integrity level (ASIL) alignment matrix—ME
38 6.4.4 Safety goal—DL
6.4.5 Hazards and risks—ME, DB
6.4.5.1 Hazards and risks—ME
6.4.5.2 Hazards and risks—DB
6.4.6 Impact assessment vs. requirements in case of reuse of element(s)—ME, DL
39 6.4.6.1 Impact assessment vs. requirements in case of reuse of element(s)—ME
6.4.6.2 Impact assessment vs. requirements in case of reuse of element(s)—DL
6.4.7 Threat and risk—DL
6.4.8 Platform tuning for safety critical real time applications—ME
6.4.9 Real time considerations for safety analysis—ME
40 6.4.10 Modeling of the radiation working environment—ME
6.4.11 HW and SW requirements traceability—DL
6.4.12 Ensuring deterministic performance for safety applications—ME
41 6.4.13 Common mode failures—DB
6.4.14 Radiation testing requirements for safety analysis—DB
6.4.15 Parameters for real time and safety metrics—DB
6.4.16 Contention/Shared resources of functional safety real time intersections—DB
42 6.4.17 System level considerations for enabling deterministic performance—DB
7. Generic design of dependable architecture
7.1 Objectives
7.2 General
43 7.3 Inputs
7.3.1 Prerequisites
7.4 Requirements and recommendations
7.4.1 Failure mode—DL
7.4.2 Functional safety HW design—DL
7.4.3 Cybersecurity software testing—ME
44 7.4.4 Software architectural design (SAD)—ME, DL
7.4.4.1 Software architectural design (SAD)—ME
7.4.4.2 Software architectural design (SAD)—DL
7.4.5 Artificial intelligence (AI) software configuration and calibration—ME, DL
45 7.4.5.1 Artificial intelligence software configuration and calibration—ME
7.4.5.2 Artificial intelligence software configuration and calibration—DL
7.4.6 Safety mechanism and safety envelope—DL
7.4.7 Automotive safety integrity level (ASIL) decomposition—ME
46 7.4.8 System architectural design—DL
7.4.9 SW design/algorithm impact analysis—ME
7.4.10 Confidence in use of software tools evaluation—ME, DL
7.4.10.1 Confidence in use of software tools evaluation—ME
47 7.4.10.2 Confidence in use of software tools evaluation—DL
7.4.11 Criteria for coexistence of elements—ME
7.4.12 Impact assessment vs. requirements in case of reuse of element(s)—ME, DL
7.4.13 Threat and risk—DL
48 7.4.14 Software development environment—DL
7.4.15 Model interoperability—ME, DL
7.4.15.1 Model interoperability—ME
7.4.15.2 Model interoperability—DL
7.4.16 Platform tuning for safety critical real time applications—ME
49 7.4.17 Real time considerations for safety analysis—ME
7.4.18 Modeling of the radiation working environment—ME
7.4.19 Ensuring deterministic performance for safety applications—ME
7.4.20 System level considerations for deterministic performance—ME
50 7.4.21 Module design, integration, and testing report—DL
7.4.22 Dependent failure initiators (DFIs)—DB
7.4.23 Interface behavior parameters—DB
51 7.4.24 Failure modes including foreseeable misuse and known specification gaps—DB
7.4.25 Artificial intelligence training data—DB
7.4.26 Failures sources—DB
52 7.4.27 Hardware metrics assumptions—DB
7.4.28 Safety mechanisms—DB
7.4.29 Software tools safety evaluation benchmarks—DB
53 7.4.30 Failure modes for software—DB
7.4.31 System reliability-availability-and-serviceability (RAS) architecture capabilities—DB
7.4.32 Monitoring of parameters for prognostics—DB
54 7.4.33 Systematic faults—DB
7.4.34 Common mode failure—DB
7.4.35 Key parameters to consider for tradeoffs between real-time and safety metrics—DB
7.4.36 Contention/shared resources of functional safety-real time intersections—DB
55 7.4.37 System level considerations for enabling deterministic performance—DB
8. Software, hardware co-design and the interface to non-electrical/electronic system (E/E) technology
8.1 Objectives
8.2 General
56 8.3 Inputs
8.3.1 Prerequisites
8.4 Requirements and recommendations
8.4.1 Hardware software interface—DL
57 8.4.2 Electrical/electronic (E/E) to non-electrical/electronic interface—DL
9. Implementation aspects
9.1 Objectives
9.2 General
58 9.3 Inputs
9.3.1 Prerequisites
9.3.2 Further supporting information
9.4 Requirements and recommendations
9.4.1 Cybersecurity software testing—ME
9.4.2 Artificial intelligence training—ME, DB
9.4.3 Fault model for side channel threats (HW)/fault extraction/injection—ME
59 9.4.4 Software development environment—DL
9.4.5 Coding guidelines/code review—ME
9.4.6 Module design, integration, and testing report—DL
60 10. Verification, integration, and analysis
10.1 Objectives
10.2 General
10.2.1 V-model for verification and analysis
10.3 Inputs
10.3.1 Prerequisites
61 10.4 Requirements and recommendations
10.4.1 Failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA)/failure modes effects and diagnostics analysis (FMEDA)—ME, DL, DB
10.4.1.1 Failure modes effects and diagnostics analysis—DL
10.4.1.2 Failure modes effects and diagnostics analysis—ME
62 10.4.1.3 Failure mode—DB
10.4.1.4 Failure modes and effects analysis—DB
10.4.2 Action priority (AP)—ME
10.4.3 Fault tree analysis (FTA)—ME, DB
10.4.3.1 Fault tree analysis—ME
63 10.4.3.2 Fault tree analysis—DB
10.4.4 Dependent failure analysis (DFA)—ME, DL, DB
10.4.4.1 Dependent failure analysis—ME
10.4.4.2 Dependent failure analysis—DL
10.4.4.3 Dependent failure analysis—DB
10.4.5 Dependability manual—DL
64 10.4.6 Base failure rate (BFR)—DL, DB
10.4.6.1 Base failure rate—DL
10.4.6.2 Base failure rate—DB
10.4.7 Functional interface analysis (FIA)—ME
65 10.4.8 Hardware random failures evaluation—ME
10.4.9 Vulnerability factors modeling—ME
10.4.10 Stochastic behavior analysis—ME
66 10.4.11 Systematic analysis—ME
10.4.12 Operational situations and operating modes—ME, DL
10.4.13 Requirement’s traceability in verification, validation, and testing—DL
67 10.4.14 Safety mechanism verification—DB
10.4.15 Safety mechanism integration database—DB
10.4.16 AI System stimulus and safety performance indicator—DB
68 10.4.17 Systems theoretic process analysis (STPA)—ME
10.4.18 Hazard analysis and risk assessment (HARA)—ME, DB
10.4.19 Coexistence analysis—ME
69 10.4.20 Software components qualification—ME
10.4.21 Cybersecurity software testing—ME
10.4.22 Safety verification for safety goal violation—DL, ME
10.4.22.1 Safety verification for safety goal violation—ME
70 10.4.22.2 Safety verification for safety goal violation—DL
10.4.23 Fault model for side channel threats (HW)/fault extraction/injection—ME
10.4.24 Best practice for system integration and testing of intended functionality—ME
10.4.25 Freedom from interference (FFI)—ME, DL
10.4.25.1 Freedom from interference—ME
71 10.4.25.2 Freedom from interference—DL
10.4.26 Artificial intelligence safety validation—ME
10.4.27 Use of formal methods to verify real time performance—ME
10.4.28 Functional insufficiency of the intended functionality—ME, DL
10.4.28.1 Functional Insufficiency of the intended functionality—ME
72 10.4.28.2 Functional insufficiency of the intended functionality—DL
10.4.29 Collection, inferring, and standardization of failures sources—ME
10.4.30 Common mode analysis (CMA)—ME
10.4.31 Commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) safety analysis—ME
10.4.32 Artificial intelligence system safety performance indicator—ME
73 10.4.33 Production verification of safety mechanisms—ME
10.4.34 Methodology for the validation of vulnerability factors—ME
10.4.35 Single event effects—DL, DB
74 10.4.35.1 Single event effects—DL
10.4.35.2 Spectra of energetic particles—DB
10.4.35.3 Single event effects—DB
10.4.36 Software tools safety evaluation—DB
10.4.37 Effects and software real time constraints—DB
75 11. Dependability validation of the system integrated into the overall product with regard to the feature behavior in the operational domain
11.1 Objectives
11.2 General
11.3 Inputs
11.3.1 Prerequisites
11.3.2 Further supporting information
76 11.4 Requirements and recommendations
11.4.1 Dependability validation environment
11.4.2 Specification of dependability validation
11.4.3 Execution of dependability validation
77 11.4.4 Evaluation
11.4.5 Safety requirements—ME, DL
11.4.6 Safety requirements evaluation—ME
78 11.4.7 Artificial intelligence system safety performance indicator—ME, DB
11.4.8 Artificial intelligence safety validation—ME
11.4.9 Operational situations and operating modes—ME, DL
11.4.10 Methodology for the validation of vulnerability factors—ME
79 11.4.11 System level considerations for deterministic performance—ME
11.4.12 Assumptions of use—DL
11.4.13 Safety diagnostic information—DL
80 11.4.14 Safety goal—DL
11.4.15 System/Component/IP-Level hardware and software requirements traceability—DL
11.4.16 Requirements traceability in verification, validation, and testing—DL
11.4.17 Operational situations and modes, use environment, performance metrics, and dynamic conditions—DB
81 12. Post-release activities
12.1 Objectives
12.2 General
12.3 Inputs
12.3.1 Prerequisites
82 12.4 Requirements and recommendations
12.4.1 Safety diagnostic information—DL
12.4.2 Monitoring of parameters for prognostics—DB
12.4.3 Identification, impact, and resolution of safety anomalies—ME
83 12.4.4 Artificial intelligence models update—ME
12.4.5 Proven in use evaluation—ME
13. Dependability evaluation
13.1 Objectives
13.2 General
84 13.3 Requirements and recommendations
13.3.1 Safety requirements evaluation—ME
85 13.3.2 Safety assessment for software updates—ME
13.3.3 Hardware elements evaluation—ME, DL
13.3.3.1 Hardware elements evaluation—ME
13.3.3.2 Hardware elements evaluation—DL
13.3.4 Safety case—DL
86 13.3.5 Assessment for conflicts between safe and secure system reactions—ME
13.3.6 Identification, impact, and resolution of safety anomalies—ME
13.3.7 Tradeoff assessment for real time and safety metrics—ME
13.3.8 Confirmation measures—DL
87 Annex A (informative) Proposed safety security alignment flow
A.1 Overview
A.2 Alignment flow at item, system, and IP/SoC levels
89 A.3 Safety security alignment matrix
90 A.3.1 Deliverables from each discipline for requirements alignment
A.3.1.1 Safety team
A.3.1.2 Security team
A.3.2 Example use case—Power steering system
92 Annex B (informative) SIPOC analysis-based needs traceability
B.1 Objectives
B.2 General
93 B.3 Inputs
B.3.1 Prerequisites
B.3.2 Further supporting information
B.4 Recommendations
B.5 Work products
94 Annex C (informative) Dependability clauses and requirements
C.1 Introduction
C.2 Generic E/E system description
97 C.3 Generic dependability lifecycle definition
C.3.1 Product lifecycle phases
98 C.3.2 Development phase
100 C.3.3 Dependable product development lifecycle
102 C.3.3.1 Design and verification of design
103 C.3.3.2 Integration and verification, and validation
104 C.3.4 Focusing on functional safety engineering
C.3.4.1 Guaranteeing dependability by common rules on systematics
C.3.4.2 Dependability by balancing and arbitrating contradicting measures
105 C.3.4.3 Affordable dependability
C.3.4.4 Conclusion
106 C.3.5 Lifecycle phases beyond development
C.3.5.1 Production
C.3.5.2 Commissioning, service, and maintenance
107 C.3.5.3 Operation
C.3.5.4 Decommissioning
C.4 Dependability management
C.4.1 Methodology and description language for dependability management
110 C.4.2 Database (DB) for dependability management
112 C.5 Product definition
113 C.5.1 User story, user feature, and addressable market
114 C.5.2 Methodology, description language, and database for user story, user feature, and the addressable market
116 C.5.3 Overall system feature behavior in operational domain, system/item definition addressing all dependability attributes
C.5.4 Methodology, description language, and database for operational domain, system/item definition addressing all dependability attributes
118 C.6 Generic requirements elicitation process of dependability lifecycle
C.6.1 General
119 C.6.2 Methodological approach to requirement elicitation
C.6.2.1 Prerequisites for elicitation
121 C.6.2.2 Flow compliant requirements
122 C.6.2.3 Formal and informal aspects of requirements elicitation
123 C.6.3 Identification of requirement types
C.6.3.1 Requirements for product development
C.6.3.2 Requirements for post release activities
C.6.3.3 Requirements for verification and validation
124 C.6.4 Proposed data description language for requirements
C.6.4.1 Elaboration of the data description language
C.6.5 Methodology and description language for requirement elicitation
129 C.6.6 Database for requirement elicitation
130 C.7 Generic design of dependable architecture
C.7.1 Modeling languages
131 C.7.2 Modeling technique
C.7.2.1 Modeling language premises and architectural views
132 C.7.2.2 Description language
134 C.7.3 Methodology, description language, and database for dependable architecture
146 C.8 Software and hardware co-design and the interface to non-E/E technology
C.8.1 Description language or SW, HW co-design
147 C.9 Implementation aspects
C.9.1 Elements to be developed
C.9.2 Reusing existing elements
C.9.3 Methodology and description language of implementation aspects
148 C.10 Verification, integration, and analysis
C.10.1 Introduction
149 C.10.2 V-model for functional verification and analysis
C.10.2.1 Layering model
150 C.10.3 Analysis activities
C.10.3.1 Hazard analysis and risk assessment (HARA)
C.10.3.2 Types of functional safety analysis supporting verification
C.10.3.2.1 Failure modes and effects analysis
151 C.10.3.2.2 Failure modes effects and diagnostics analysis
C.10.3.2.3 Fault tree analysis (FTA)
C.10.3.2.4 Dependent failure analysis (DFA)
C.10.3.2.5 Coexistence analysis
C.10.3.2.6 Freedom from interference
C.10.3.2.7 Detailed FMEDA and safety mechanism verification
152 C.10.3.3 Safety mechanism integration database
153 C.10.3.4 Verification activities
C.10.3.4.1 Informal reviews
C.10.3.4.2 Formal reviews
C.10.3.4.3 Functional verification activities
154 C.10.4 Methodology and description language for verification, integration, and analysis
164 C.10.4.1. Database for verification, integration, and analysis
168 C.11 Dependability validation of the system integrated into the overall product with regard to the feature behavior in OD
C.11.1 Methodology and description language for dependability validation
170 C.12 Post-release activities
C.12.1 Methodology for post-release activities
172 C.13 Dependability evaluation
C.13.1 General
173 C.13.2 Method and description language
C.13.2.1 Systematic approach
174 C.13.2.2 Procedure
177 C.13.2.3 Description language
C.13.2.4 Database
C.13.3 Methodology and description language for dependability evaluation
180 C.13.3.1 Database
181 Annex D (informative) Bibliography
183 Back cover
IEEE 2851-2023
$93.71