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IEEE 802.11w-2009

$109.42

IEEE Standard for Information technology – Telecommunications and information exchange between systems – Local and metropolitan area networks – Specific requirements. Part 11: Wireless LAN Medium Access Control (MAC) and Physical Layer (PHY) Specifications Amendment 4: Protected Management Frames

Published By Publication Date Number of Pages
IEEE 2009 111
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Amendment Standard – Superseded. This amendment specifies the extensions to IEEE Std 802.11 for wireless local area networks (WLANs) providing mechanisms for protecting management frames.

PDF Catalog

PDF Pages PDF Title
1 IEEE Std 802.11w-2009 (Amendment to IEEE Std 802.11-2007), Front cover
3 Title page
6 Introduction

Notice to users

Laws and regulations

Copyrights

Updating of IEEE documents
7 Errata

Interpretations

Patents

Participants
12 Contents
19 List of figures
20 List of tables
21 Important notice
22 3. Definitions
4. Abbreviations and acronyms
5. General description
5.2 Components of the IEEE 802.11 architecture
5.2.3 Distribution system (DS) concepts
5.2.3.2 RSNA
23 5.4 Overview of the services
5.4.2 Services that support the distribution service
5.4.2.4 Disassociation
5.4.3 Access control and data confidentiality services
5.4.3.2 Deauthentication
5.4.3.3 Data confidentiality
24 5.4.3.4 Key management
5.4.3.5 Data origin authenticity
5.4.3.6 Replay detection
5.4.3.7 Fast BSS transition
5.4.3.8 Robust Management frame protection
25 5.8 IEEE Std 802.11 and IEEE Std 802.1X-2004
5.8.2 Infrastructure functional model overview
5.8.2.1 Authentication and key management (AKM) operations with Authentication Server (AS)
27 5.8.2.2 Operations with PSK
5.8.5 PMKSA caching
5.8.6 Protection of broadcast and multicast Robust Management frames
28 6. MAC service definition
6.1 Overview of MAC services
6.1.2 Security services
7. Frame formats
7.1 MAC Frame formats
7.1.3 Frame fields
7.1.3.1 Frame control field
7.1.3.1.8 Protected Frame field
29 7.2 Format of individual frame types
7.2.3 Management frames
7.2.3.3 Disassociation frame format
7.2.3.5 Association Response frame format
30 7.2.3.7 Reassociation Response frame format
7.2.3.11 Deauthentication
31 7.2.3.12 Action frame format
7.3 Management frame body components
7.3.1 Fields that are not information elements
7.3.1.9 Status Code field
32 7.3.1.11 Action field
7.3.2 Information elements
34 7.3.2.25 RSN information element
35 7.3.2.25.1 Cipher suites
37 7.3.2.25.2 AKM suites
7.3.2.25.3 RSN capabilities
38 7.3.2.48 Fast BSS transition information element (FTIE)
39 7.3.2.49 Timeout Interval information element (TIE)
7.3.2.54 Supported Regulatory Classes element
7.3.2.55 Management MIC information element
40 7.4 Action frame format details
7.4.5 Vendor-specific action details
7.4.7 Public Action details
7.4.7.1 Public Action frames
41 7.4.7.9 DSE Power Constraint frame format
7.4.7.10 Vendor Specific Public Action frame format
7.4.8 Action frame details
7.4.9 SA Query Action frame details
7.4.9.1 SA Query Request frame
42 7.4.9.2 SA Query Response frame
7.4.9a Protected Dual of Public Action frames
7.4.9a.1 Protected Dual of Public Action details
43 7.4.9a.2 Protected DSE Enablement frame format
7.4.9a.3 Protected DSE Deenablement frame format
7.4.9a.4 Protected Extended Channel Switch Announcement frame format
7.4.9a.5 Protected DSE Measurement Request frame format
7.4.9a.6 Protected DSE Measurement Report frame format
44 7.4.9a.7 Protected DSE Power Constraint frame format
8. Security
8.1 Framework
8.1.1 Security methods
8.1.3 RSNA establishment
8.3 RSNA data confidentiality and integrity protocols
8.3.1 Overview
45 8.3.3 CTR with CBC-MAC Protocol (CCMP)
8.3.3.1 CCMP Overview
8.3.3.3 CCMP cryptographic encapsulation
8.3.3.3.2 Construct AAD
46 8.3.3.3.3 Construct CCM nonce
8.3.3.3.5 CCM originator processing
8.3.3.4 CCMP decapsulation
47 8.3.3.4.1 CCM recipient processing
8.3.3.4.3 PN and replay detection
8.3.4 The Broadcast/Multicast integrity protocol
48 8.3.4.1 BIP overview
8.3.4.2 BIP MMPDU format
8.3.4.3 BIP AAD construction
8.3.4.4 BIP replay protection
49 8.3.4.5 BIP transmission
8.3.4.6 BIP reception
50 8.4 RSNA security association management
8.4.1 Security associations
8.4.1.1 Security association definitions
8.4.1.1.3 GTKSA
8.4.1.1.3a IGTKSA
8.4.1.2 Security association life cycle
8.4.1.2.1 Security association in an ESS
51 8.4.3 RSNA policy selection in an ESS
52 8.4.4 RSNA policy selection in an IBSS
53 8.4.6 RSNA authentication in an ESS
8.4.6.1 Preauthentication and RSNA key management
8.4.6.2 Cached PMKSAs and RSNA key management
8.4.9 RSNA key management in an IBSS
8.4.10 RSNA security association termination
54 8.4.11 Protection of Robust Management frames
55 8.4.12 Robust Management frame Selection Procedure
8.5 Keys and key distribution
8.5.1 Key hierarchy
8.5.1.1 PRF
56 8.5.1.2 Pairwise key hierarchy
8.5.1.3 Group key hierarchy
8.5.1.3a Integrity group key hierarchy
8.5.1.4 PeerKey key hierarchy
57 8.5.2 EAPOL-Key frames
8.5.2.1 EAPOL-Key frame notation
58 8.5.3 4-Way Handshake
8.5.3.2 4-Way Handshake Message 2
8.5.3.3 4-Way Handshake Message 3
8.5.3.6 Sample 4-Way Handshake
59 8.5.4 Group Key Handshake
60 8.5.4.1 Group Key Handshake Message 1
8.5.4.4 Sample Group Key Handshake
61 8.5.5 RSNA Supplicant key management state machine
62 8.5.5.2 Supplicant state machine variables
8.5.5.3 Supplicant state machine procedures
64 8.5.6 RSNA Authenticator key management state machine
66 8.6 Mapping EAPOL keys to IEEE 802.11 keys
8.6.3 Mapping PTK to CCMP keys
8.6.6a Mapping IGTK to BIP Keys
67 8.7 Per-frame pseudo-code
8.7.2 RSNA frame pseudo-code
8.7.2.1 Per-MSDU Tx pseudo-code
8.7.2.1a Per-MMPDU Tx pseudo-code
69 8.7.2.2a Per-MPDU Tx pseudo-code for MMPDU
8.7.2.3a Per-MPDU Rx pseudo-code for an MMPDU
73 8.7.2.5 Per-MMPDU Rx pseudo-code
74 10. Layer Management
10.3 MLME SAP interface
10.3.17 SetKeys
10.3.17.1 MLME-SETKEYS.request
10.3.17.1.2 Semantics of the service primitive
10.3.18 DeleteKeys
10.3.18.1 MLME-DELETEKEYS.request
10.3.18.1.2 Semantics of the service primitive
10.3.22 SetProtection
10.3.22.1 MLME-SETPROTECTION.request
10.3.22.1.2 Semantics of the service primitive
75 10.3.39 SA Query support
10.3.39.1 MLME-SAQuery.request
10.3.39.1.1 Function
10.3.39.1.2 Semantics of the service primitive
10.3.39.1.3 When generated
10.3.39.1.4 Effect of receipt
10.3.39.2 MLME-SAQuery.confirm
10.3.39.2.1 Function
10.3.39.2.2 Semantics of the service primitive
76 10.3.39.2.3 When generated
10.3.39.2.4 Effect of receipt
10.3.39.3 MLME-SAQuery.indication
10.3.39.3.1 Function
10.3.39.3.2 Semantics of the service primitive
77 10.3.39.3.3 When generated
10.3.39.3.4 Effect of receipt
10.3.39.4 MLME-SAQuery.response
10.3.39.4.1 Function
10.3.39.4.2 Semantics of the service primitive
10.3.39.4.3 When generated
10.3.39.4.4 Effect of receipt
10.3.40 Protected Extended Channel Switch Announcement
78 10.3.40.1 MLME-PDEXTCHANNELSWITCH.request
10.3.40.1.1 Function
10.3.40.1.2 Semantics of the service primitive
10.3.40.1.3 When generated
10.3.40.1.4 Effect of receipt
10.3.40.2 MLME-PDEXTCHANNELSWITCH.confirm
10.3.40.2.1 Function
79 10.3.40.2.2 Semantics of the service primitive
10.3.40.2.3 When generated
10.3.40.2.4 Effect of receipt
10.3.40.3 MLME-PDEXTCHANNELSWITCH.indication
10.3.40.3.1 Function
10.3.40.3.2 Semantics of the service primitive
80 10.3.40.3.3 When generated
10.3.40.3.4 Effect of receipt
10.3.40.4 MLME-PDEXTCHANNELSWITCH.response
10.3.40.4.1 Function
10.3.40.4.2 Semantics of the service primitive
81 10.3.40.4.3 When generated
10.3.40.4.4 Effect of receipt
10.3.41 Protected DSE Power Constraint Announcement
10.3.41.1 MLME-PDDSETPC.request
10.3.41.1.1 Function
10.3.41.1.2 Semantics of the service primitive
82 10.3.41.1.3 When generated
10.3.41.1.4 Effect of receipt
10.3.41.2 MLME-PDDSETPC.confirm
10.3.41.2.1 Function
10.3.41.2.2 Semantics of the service primitive
83 10.3.41.2.3 When generated
10.3.41.2.4 Effect of receipt
10.3.41.3 MLME-PDDSETPC.indication
10.3.41.3.1 Function
10.3.41.3.2 Semantics of the service primitive
10.3.41.3.3 When generated
10.3.41.3.4 Effect of receipt
84 10.3.41.4 MLME-PDDSETPC.response
10.3.41.4.1 Function
10.3.41.4.2 Semantics of the service primitive
10.3.41.4.3 When generated
10.3.41.4.4 Effect of receipt
10.3.42 Protected Enablement
10.3.42.1 MLME-PDENABLEMENT.request
10.3.42.1.1 Function
10.3.42.1.2 Semantics of the service primitive
85 10.3.42.1.3 When generated
10.3.42.1.4 Effect of receipt
10.3.42.2 MLME-PDENABLEMENT.confirm
10.3.42.2.1 Function
10.3.42.2.2 Semantics of the service primitive
86 10.3.42.2.3 When generated
10.3.42.2.4 Effect of receipt
10.3.42.3 MLME-PDENABLEMENT.indication
10.3.42.3.1 Function
10.3.42.3.2 Semantics of the service primitive
87 10.3.42.3.3 When generated
10.3.42.3.4 Effect of receipt
10.3.42.4 MLME-PDENABLEMENT.response
10.3.42.4.1 Function
10.3.42.4.2 Semantics of the service primitive
88 10.3.42.4.3 When generated
10.3.42.4.4 Effect of receipt
10.3.43 Protected Deenablement
10.3.43.1 MLME-PDDEENABLEMENT.request
10.3.43.1.1 Function
10.3.43.1.2 Semantics of the service primitive
10.3.43.1.3 When generated
10.3.43.1.4 Effect of receipt
89 10.3.43.2 MLME-PDDEENABLEMENT.confirm
10.3.43.2.1 Function
10.3.43.2.2 Semantics of the service primitive
10.3.43.2.3 When generated
10.3.43.2.4 Effect of receipt
10.3.43.3 MLME-PDDEENABLEMENT.indication
10.3.43.3.1 Function
90 10.3.43.3.2 Semantics of the service primitive
10.3.43.3.3 When generated
10.3.43.3.4 Effect of receipt
10.3.44 Vendor Specific Public Action
10.3.44.1 MLME-PVSPECIFIC.request
10.3.44.1.1 Function
10.3.44.1.2 Semantics of the service primitive
91 10.3.44.1.3 When generated
10.3.44.1.4 Effect of receipt
10.3.44.2 MLME-PVSPECIFIC.confirm
10.3.44.2.1 Function
10.3.44.2.2 Semantics of the service primitive
92 10.3.44.2.3 When generated
10.3.44.2.4 Effect of receipt
10.3.44.3 MLME-PVSPECIFIC.indication
10.3.44.3.1 Function
10.3.44.3.2 Semantics of the service primitive
10.3.44.3.3 When generated
10.3.44.3.4 Effect of receipt
93 11. MLME
11.3 STA authentication and association
11.3.1 Authentication and deauthentication
11.3.1.1 Authentication-originating STA
11.3.1.2 Authentication-destination STA
11.3.2 Association, reassociation, and disassociation
11.3.2.2 AP association procedures
94 11.3.2.4 AP reassociation procedures
11.11 DSE procedures
11.11.1 General
95 11.12 Broadcast and multicast Robust Management frame procedures
11.13 SA Query procedures
11A. Fast BSS Transition
11A.2 Key holders
11A.2.2 Authenticator key holders
96 11A.4 FT initial mobility domain association
11A.4.2 FT initial mobility domain association in an RSN
97 11A.5 FT protocol
11A.5.2 Over-the-air FT protocol authentication in an RSN
98 11A.5.3 Over-the-DS FT Protocol authentication in an RSN
99 11A.6 FT Resource Request Protocol
11A.6.2 Over-the-air fast BSS transition with resource request
11A.6.3 Over-the-DS fast BSS transition with resource request
100 11A.7 FT reassociation
11A.7.1 FT reassociation in an RSN
11A.8 FT authentication sequence
11A.8.5 FT authentication sequence: contents of fourth message
101 11A.9 FT security architecture state machines
11A.9.3 R1KH state machine
103 Annex A (normative) Protocol Implementation Conformance Statement (PICS) proforma

A.4 PICS proforma-IEEE Std 802.11-2007
A.4.4 MAC protocol
A.4.4.1 MAC protocol capabilities
105 Annex D (normative) ASN.1 encoding of the MAC and PHY MIB
110 Annex H (informative) RSNA reference implementations and test vectors

H.8 Test vectors for AES-128-CMAC
H.9 Management Frame Protection test vectors
H.9.1 BIP with broadcast Deauthentication frame
111 H.9.2 CCMP with unicast Deauthentication frame
IEEE 802.11w-2009
$109.42