IEEE 802.15.9-2021

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IEEE Standard for Transport of Key Management Protocol (KMP) Datagrams

Published By	Publication Date	Number of Pages
IEEE	2021

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Description

Revision Standard – Active. A message exchange framework based on information elements as a transport method for key management protocol (KMP) datagrams and guidelines for the use of some existing KMPs with IEEE Std 802.15.4(TM) is defined in this standard. A new KMP is not created in this standard. In support of KMP transmission and reception, a generic multiplexed data service layer that can be used to transmit large packets from the upper KMP to another peer and that provides for protocol discrimination is also provided in this standard. The multiplexed data service provides a fragmentation and multiplexing layer for those packets so they can be delivered over smaller MAC layer frames and multiplexed on the recipient end to the right processing service. The multiplexing provides for EtherType protocol discrimination.

PDF Catalog

PDF Pages	PDF Title
1	IEEE Std 802.15.9™-2021 Front cover
2	Title page
4	Important Notices and Disclaimers Concerning IEEE Standards Documents
7	Participants
9	Introduction
10	Contents
13	1. Overview 1.1 General 1.2 Scope 1.3 Purpose 1.4 Deprecated features 1.5 Word usage
14	2. Normative references 3. Definitions, acronyms, and abbreviations 3.1 Definitions 3.2 Acronyms and abbreviations
15	4. Introduction 4.1 Overview
16	4.2 System view
17	4.3 Network view 4.4 Security associations 4.5 Process flow
18	4.6 State machine 4.7 Address formats 4.8 KMP payload size 4.9 Format conventions 5. MPX data service 5.1 Description
19	5.2 MPX data primitives 5.2.1 MPX data primitive use
22	5.2.2 MPX-DATA.request
24	5.2.3 MPX-DATA.confirm 5.2.4 MPX-DATA.indication
26	5.3 MPX-PURGE primitive 5.3.1 MPX-PURGE primitive use 5.3.2 MPX-PURGE.request
27	5.3.3 MPX-PURGE.confirm
28	5.4 MPX PIB attributes 6. KMP transport service 6.1 Overview
29	6.2 KMP-CREATE primitives 6.2.1 KMP-CREATE primitive use
30	6.2.2 KMP-CREATE.request
32	6.2.3 KMP-CREATE.confirm 6.2.4 KMP-CREATE.indication
33	6.2.5 KMP-CREATE.response
34	6.3 KMP-FINISHED primitives 6.3.1 Overview
35	6.3.2 KMP-FINISHED. indication
36	6.4 KMP-DELETE primitives 6.4.1 Overview 6.4.2 KMP-DELETE.request
37	6.4.3 KMP-DELETE.confirm 6.4.4 KMP-DELETE.indication
38	6.5 KMP-PURGE primitives 6.5.1 Overview
39	6.5.2 KMP-PURGE.request 6.5.3 KMP-PURGE.confirm
40	7. MPX IE format 7.1 IE overview 7.2 Payload IE group ID 7.3 MPX IE content 7.3.1 Overall structure
41	7.3.2 Transaction Control field 7.3.2.1 Overview of the Transaction Control field 7.3.2.2 Transfer Type field
42	7.3.2.3 Transaction ID field
43	7.3.2.4 Fragment Number field 7.3.3 Total Upper Layer Frame Size field 7.3.4 Multiplex ID field 7.3.5 Upper Layer Frame Fragment field
44	8. KMP Service 8.1 KMP ID 8.2 Vendor-specific KMPs
45	9. State machines 9.1 Inbound state machine
47	9.2 Outbound state machine
48	Annex A (informative) KMP specifics—IEEE 802.1X/MKA A.1 Description A.1.1 Device authentication
49	A.1.2 Device authentication and cryptographic key agreement A.1.2.1 Overview A.1.2.2 IEEE 802.1X/MKA A.1.2.2.1 Overview
50	A.1.2.2.2 Cryptographic key agreement with pre-shared CAK A.1.2.3 IEEE 802.11/4WH and IEEE 802.11/GKH
51	A.1.2.4 ETSI TS102 887-2 node-to-node (N2N) link key establishment
52	A.2 Use cases A.2.1 Overview
53	A.2.2 Isolated enclave A.2.3 Star topology A.2.4 Mesh A.3 IEEE 802.15 specifics A.3.1 EAPOL message framing A.3.2 EAPOL-MKA A.3.2.1 General A.3.2.2 ICV calculation
54	A.3.2.3 MKA Basic parameter set A.3.2.4 MACsec SAK Use parameter set A.3.2.5 Distributed SAK parameter set
55	A.3.2.6 MKA state machine—suspension A.3.2.7 MKA state machine—Key Server selection A.3.3 EAPOL-KEY A.3.4 ETSI TS 102 887-2 A.3.5 Group Traffic Key Generation
57	Annex B (informative) KMP specifics—IKEv2 B.1 Description B.2 Use cases B.2.1 General B.2.2 Minimal IKEv2 use cases
58	B.2.3 Enterprise or large-scale IKEv2 use cases B.3 IKEv2 and IEEE 802.15 specifics B.3.1 Overview B.3.2 Supported IKEv2 features B.3.3 Unused IKEv2 features B.3.4 Message framing
59	B.3.5 Algorithm negotiation B.3.6 Key derivation B.3.7 Broadcast and multicast key distribution
60	Annex C (informative) KMP specifics—HIP C.1 Description C.2 Use cases C.2.1 General C.2.2 Isolated enclave
61	C.2.3 Home net C.2.4 City net C.2.5 RFID networks C.2.6 Infrastructure sensor nets C.3 IEEE 802.15TM specifics C.3.1 Message framing C.3.2 Key derivation and security PIB interaction C.3.3 Deployment recommendations
62	C.3.4 HIT authentication C.3.4.1 ACL-based C.3.4.2 RADIUS-based C.3.4.3 Certificate-based C.3.4.4 Coordinator authentication
63	Annex D (informative) KMP specifics—PANA D.1 Description D.2 Use cases D.3 IEEE 802.15 specifics
66	Annex E (informative) KMP specifics—Dragonfly E.1 Description E.1.1 General E.1.2 Device authentication E.1.3 Device authentication and cryptographic key establishment E.1.3.1 General
67	E.1.3.2 Dragonfly authentication in client/initiator to server/responder mode E.1.3.3 Dragonfly authentication in peer-to-peer mode
68	E.2 Use cases E.3 Dragonfly and IEEE 802.15 specifics E.3.1 Overview
69	E.3.2 Algorithm negotiation E.3.3 Key derivation E.3.4 Message framing E.3.4.1 General E.3.4.2 Dragonfly commit message
70	E.3.4.3 Dragonfly confirm message E.3.5 Broadcast and multicast key distribution
71	Annex F (informative) IEEE 802.15.4 security F.1 Description F.2 Link keys
72	F.3 Group keys F.3.1 Overview F.3.2 Key Identifier Mode 0x01 F.3.3 Key Identifier Mode 0x02
73	F.3.4 Key Identifier Mode 0x03
74	Annex G (informative) Bibliography
76	Back cover