This ISA technical report provides a current assessment of various cyber security tools, mitigation counter-measures, and technologies that may effectively apply to the modern electronically based IACSs regulating and monitoring numerous industries and critical infrastructures. It describes several categories of control system-centric cyber security technologies; the types of products available in those categories; the pros and cons of using those products in the automated IACS environments relative to the expected threats and known cyber vulnerabilities; and, most important, the preliminary recommendations and guidance for using these cyber security technology products and/or countermeasures.

This document is intended to supply a general list of work-oriented functions, activities, tasks and duties that an instrument, instrument/electrical, automation or control system technician should be skilled at in order to successfully work in this technical area. It is intended to be a dynamic document that will change as the equipment the technician works with evolves. The document is inclusive of the most common work-oriented functions. Specialty area technicians are expected to have additional skills and higher technical competences that are not included in this general list.

Toxic gas detection in process safety management provides personnel protection by minimizing the probability of toxic gases reaching hazardous levels. Criteria are developed to establish toxic gas levels to initiate alarms, initiate increase in ventilation rates and to initiate shutdown of processes generating the toxic gas that has breached containment. This guide provides techniques for the use of toxic gas sensors and controllers to monitor and control sources of toxic gas release into the atmosphere within designated spaces in industrial locations.

ISA TR96.05.01-2017:

• is informative and does not contain any mandatory requirements.
• is limited to automated valves normally operating in either a full open or full closed position.
• introduces the concept of margin analysis as a method of assessing PST results.
• relates loss of functional margin with possible failure modes and discusses the effectiveness of different PST approaches in identifying a loss of functional margin.
• discusses the possibility and effects of over-stroking the automated valve.
• discusses the possibility and effects of over-torqueing the stem of the automated valve.
• discusses the rationalization/justification in performing PST (benefits vs risk).

The boundary of the automated valve includes the following:

• Valve, Actuator, Control Systems, Ancillary Components, and Monitoring Devices
• Actuation media regulation and filtration system
• Actuated valves whose safe position is specified
• Automated valves that employ only pneumatic or hydraulic actuators
• Guidance related to testing of electric valve actuators is provided in ANSI/ISA-96.02.01 and are excluded from the scope of this technical report

Guidance is provided for the following:

• Identifying when partial stroke testing may be useful
• Various criteria to consider when selecting the partial stroke method, e.g., automated versus manual test execution, spurious trip potential, actuator force or torque output, and on-line maintainability
• The advantages and disadvantages of four basic methods of partial stroke testing: mechanical limiting, travel limiting, position based, and solenoid operated valves
• The capability and limitations of the four measurement, analysis, and acceptance criteria approaches used to assess PST results.

Process operating facilities utilize instrumentation to monitor and control processes. The
performance of this instrumentation ties directly into product quality and product throughput. In addition,
the process may become hazardous to operating facility personnel, the community, and the environment
if control is lost.

Some instruments perform essential functions during emergency response activities and a high degree of confidence is required to ensure that instrumentation will function correctly during an emergency.

1.2 This guideline is developed to assist engineering, operations, and maintenance personnel with establishing the classification of their instrumentation, thus facilitating all aspects of designing and
maintaining reliable operating facility instrumentation. Global instrumentation manufacturers classify their
equipment according to various country classification standards (see clauses 6.3, 6.7, 6.8).

Since its inception, the OMAC Packaging Machine Language (PackML) group has been using a variety of information sources and technical documents to define a common approach, or machine language, for automated machines. The primary goals are to encourage a common "look and feel" across a plant floor, and to enable and encourage industry innovation. The PackML group is recognized globally and consists of control vendors, OEM's, system integrators, universities, and end users, which collaborate on definitions that endeavour to be consistent with the ISA88 standards and consistent with the technology and the changing needs of a majority of automated machinery. The term "machine" used in this report is equivalent to an ISA88 "unit".

This has led to the following:

• A definition of machine/unit state types

• A definition of machine/unit control modes
• A definition of unit control mode management
• State models, state descriptions, and mode and state transitions
• A definition of the minimum PackTags required for performance monitoring

Defines format or graphical representation for recipes used in the automation of batch processing plants as defined in Part I of ANSI/ISA-S88.01-1995.

ISA TR84.00.08-2017 addresses wireless technology-based sensors that are used in Independent Protection Layers (IPLs) providing a risk reduction factor of less than or equal to 10 (non-SIS IPL) by the authority having jurisdiction (typically the owner/operator or local regulatory authority), and establishes guidance and considerations for their utilization in the process sector. The use of wireless technology for higher risk reduction factors such as a Safety Instrumented Function has been specifically excluded from consideration in the scope of this technical report.