{"id":397317,"date":"2024-10-20T04:29:37","date_gmt":"2024-10-20T04:29:37","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/pdfstandards.shop\/product\/uncategorized\/ieee-8802-112005-amd6-2006\/"},"modified":"2024-10-26T08:17:11","modified_gmt":"2024-10-26T08:17:11","slug":"ieee-8802-112005-amd6-2006","status":"publish","type":"product","link":"https:\/\/pdfstandards.shop\/product\/publishers\/ieee\/ieee-8802-112005-amd6-2006\/","title":{"rendered":"IEEE 8802-11:2005\/AMD6-2006"},"content":{"rendered":"

Amendment Standard – Superseded. Security mechanisms for IEEE 802.11 are defined in this amendment, which includes a definition of WEP for backward compatibility with the original standard, IEEE Std 802.11, 1999 Edition. This amendment defines TKIP and CCMP, which provide more robust data protection mechanisms than WEP affords. It introduces the concept of a security association into IEEE 802.11 and defines security association management protocols called the 4-Way Handshake and the Group Key Handshake. Also, it specifies how IEEE 802.1X may be utilized by IEEE 802.11 LANs to effect authentication.<\/p>\n

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PDF Pages<\/th>\nPDF Title<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n
3<\/td>\nCover <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
5<\/td>\nLocal and Metropolitan Area Networks\u2014Specific requirements\u2014Part 11: Wireless LAN Medium Access Control (MAC) and Physical Lay <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
9<\/td>\nIntroduction
Participants <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
15<\/td>\nContents <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
20<\/td>\n1. Overview
1.2 Purpose <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
21<\/td>\n2. Normative references
3. Definitions <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
25<\/td>\n4. Abbreviations and acronyms <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
27<\/td>\n5. General description
5.1 General description of the architecture
5.1.1 How wireless LAN systems are different
5.1.1.4 Interaction with other IEEE 802\u00ae layers
5.1.1.5 Interaction with non-IEEE 802 protocols
5.2 Components of the IEEE 802.11 architecture
5.2.2 Distribution system (DS) concepts
5.2.2.2 RSNA <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
28<\/td>\n5.3 Logical service interfaces
5.3.1 Station service (SS)
5.4 Overview of the services
5.4.2 Services that support the distribution service
5.4.2.2 Association
5.4.2.3 Reassociation
5.4.3 Access control and confidentiality controlservices <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
29<\/td>\n5.4.3.1 Authentication <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
30<\/td>\n5.4.3.2 Deauthentication
5.4.3.3 PrivacyConfidentiality <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
31<\/td>\n5.4.3.4 Key management
5.4.3.5 Data origin authenticity
5.4.3.6 Replay detection
5.6 Differences between ESS and IBSS LANs <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
32<\/td>\n5.7 Message information contents that support the services
5.7.5 PrivacyConfidentiality
5.7.6 Authentication
5.7.7 Deauthentication
5.8 Reference model
Figure 11- Portion of the ISO\/IEC basic reference model covered in this standard <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
33<\/td>\n5.9 IEEE 802.11 and IEEE 802.1X
5.9.1 IEEE 802.11 usage of IEEE 802.1X
5.9.2 Infrastructure functional model overview
5.9.2.1 AKM operations with AS <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
34<\/td>\nFigure 11a- Establishing the IEEE 802.11 association
Figure 11b- IEEE 802.1X EAP authentication <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
35<\/td>\nFigure 11c- Establishing pairwise and group keys <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
36<\/td>\n5.9.2.2 Operations with PSK
5.9.3 IBSS functional model description
5.9.3.1 Key usage
5.9.3.2 Sample IBSS 4-Way Handshakes
Figure 11d- Delivery of subsequent group keys <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
37<\/td>\nFigure 11e- Sample 4-Way Handshakes in an IBSS <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
38<\/td>\n5.9.3.3 IBSS IEEE 802.1X Example
5.9.4 Authenticator-to-AS protocol <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
39<\/td>\n5.9.5 PMKSA caching
6. MAC service definition
6.1 Overview of MAC services
6.1.2 Security services
Figure 11f- Example using IEEE 802.1X authentication <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
40<\/td>\n6.1.4 MAC data service architecture <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
41<\/td>\n7. Frame formats
7.1 MAC frame formats
7.1.3 Frame fields
7.1.3.1 Frame Control field
Figure 11g- MAC data plane architecture <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
42<\/td>\n7.1.3.1.9 WEPProtected Frame field
7.2 Format of individual frame types
7.2.2 Data frames
7.2.3 Management frames
7.2.3.1 Beacon frame format
Figure 13- Frame Control field
Table 5- Beacon frame body <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
43<\/td>\n7.2.3.4 Association Request frame format
7.2.3.6 Reassociation Request frame format
7.2.3.9 Probe Response frame format
7.2.3.10 Authentication frame format
Table 7- Association Request frame body
Table 9- Reassociation Request frame body
Table 12- Probe Response frame body <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
44<\/td>\n7.3 Management frame body components
7.3.1 Fixed fields
7.3.1.4 Capability Information field
7.3.1.7 Reason Code field
Table 18- Reason codes <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
45<\/td>\n7.3.1.9 Status Code field
7.3.2 Information elements
Table 19- Status codes
Table 20- Element IDs <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
46<\/td>\n7.3.2.25 RSN information element
Figure 46ta- RSN information element format <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
47<\/td>\n7.3.2.25.1 Cipher suites
Figure 46tb- Suite selector format
Table 20da- Cipher suite selectors <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
48<\/td>\n7.3.2.25.2 AKM suites
Table 20db- Cipher suite usage <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
49<\/td>\n7.3.2.25.3 RSN capabilities
Figure 46tc- RSN Capabilities field format
Table 20dc- AKM suite selectors <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
50<\/td>\n7.3.2.25.4 PMKID
Table 20dd- PTKSA\/GTKSA\/STAKeySA replay counters usage <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
51<\/td>\n8. Security
8.1 Framework
8.1.1 Security methods
8.1.2 RSNA equipment and RSNA capabilities
8.1.3 RSNA establishment <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
53<\/td>\n8.1.4 RSNA assumptions and constraints (informative)
8.2 Pre-RSNA security methods <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
54<\/td>\n8.2.1 Wired equivalent privacy (WEP)
8.2.1.1 WEP overview
8.2.1.2 WEP MPDU format
Figure 43- Construction of expanded WEP MPDU <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
55<\/td>\n8.2.1.3 WEP state
8.2.1.4 WEP procedures
8.2.1.4.1 WEP ICV algorithm
8.2.1.4.2 WEP encryption algorithm
8.2.1.4.3 WEP seed construction <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
56<\/td>\n8.2.1.4.4 WEP MPDU encapsulation
8.2.1.4.5 WEP MPDU decapsulation
Figure 43a- WEP encapsulation block diagram <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
57<\/td>\n8.2.2 Pre-RSNA authentication
8.2.2.1 Overview
8.2.2.2 Open System authentication
8.2.2.2.1 Open System authentication (first frame)
Figure 43b- WEP decapsulation block diagram <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
58<\/td>\n8.2.2.2.2 Open System authentication (final frame)
8.2.2.3 Shared Key authentication
8.2.2.3.1 Shared Key authentication (first frame) <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
59<\/td>\n8.2.2.3.2 Shared Key authentication (second frame)
8.2.2.3.3 Shared Key authentication (third frame)
8.2.2.3.4 Shared Key authentication (final frame) <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
60<\/td>\n8.2.2.3.5 Shared key MIB attributes <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
62<\/td>\n8.3 RSNA data confidentiality protocols
8.3.1 Overview
8.3.2 Temporal Key Integrity Protocol (TKIP)
8.3.2.1 TKIP overview
8.3.2.1.1 TKIP encapsulation <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
63<\/td>\n8.3.2.1.2 TKIP decapsulation
Figure 43c- TKIP encapsulation block diagram <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
64<\/td>\n8.3.2.2 TKIP MPDU formats
Figure 43d- TKIP decapsulation block diagram
Figure 43e- Construction of expanded TKIP MPDU <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
65<\/td>\n8.3.2.3 TKIP MIC
8.3.2.3.1 Motivation for the TKIP MIC <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
66<\/td>\nFigure 43f- TKIP MIC relation to IEEE 802.11 processing (informative)
Figure 43g- TKIP MIC processing format <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
67<\/td>\n8.3.2.3.2 Definition of the TKIP MIC
Figure 43h- Michael message processing <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
68<\/td>\n8.3.2.4 TKIP countermeasures procedures
Figure 43i- Michael block function <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
69<\/td>\n8.3.2.4.1 TKIP countermeasures for an Authenticator <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
70<\/td>\n8.3.2.4.2 TKIP countermeasures for a Supplicant
Figure 43j- Authenticator MIC countermeasures <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
71<\/td>\n8.3.2.5 TKIP mixing function
8.3.2.5.1 S-Box
Figure 43k- Supplicant MIC countermeasures <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
73<\/td>\n8.3.2.5.2 Phase 1 Definition (Figure 43l)
Figure 43l- Phase 1 key mixing <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
74<\/td>\n8.3.2.5.3 Phase 2 definition (see Figure 43m) <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
75<\/td>\n8.3.2.6 TKIP replay protection procedures
Figure 43m- Phase 2 key mixing <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
76<\/td>\n8.3.3 CTR with CBC-MAC Protocol (CCMP)
8.3.3.1 CCMP overview
8.3.3.2 CCMP MPDU format <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
77<\/td>\n8.3.3.3 CCMP encapsulation
Figure 43n- Expanded CCMP MPDU
Figure 43o- CCMP encapsulation block diagram <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
78<\/td>\n8.3.3.3.1 PN processing
8.3.3.3.2 Construct AAD
8.3.3.3.3 Construct CCM nonce
Figure 43p- AAD construction <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
79<\/td>\n8.3.3.3.4 Construct CCMP header
8.3.3.3.5 CCM originator processing
8.3.3.4 CCMP decapsulation
Figure 43q- Nonce construction <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
80<\/td>\n8.3.3.4.1 CCM recipient processing
Figure 43r- CCMP decapsulation block diagram <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
81<\/td>\n8.3.3.4.2 Decrypted CCMP MPDU
8.3.3.4.3 PN and replay detection
8.4 RSNA security association management
8.4.1 Security associations
8.4.1.1 Security association definitions <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
82<\/td>\n8.4.1.1.1 PMKSA
8.4.1.1.2 PTKSA
8.4.1.1.3 GTKSA <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
83<\/td>\n8.4.1.1.4 STAKeySA
8.4.1.2 Security association life cycle
8.4.1.2.1 Security association in an ESS <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
84<\/td>\n8.4.1.2.2 Security association in an IBSS <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
85<\/td>\n8.4.2 RSNA selection
8.4.3 RSNA policy selection in an ESS <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
86<\/td>\n8.4.3.1 TSN policy selection in an ESS
8.4.4 RSNA policy selection in an IBSS <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
87<\/td>\n8.4.4.1 TSN policy selection in an IBSS
8.4.5 RSN management of the IEEE 802.1X Controlled Port
8.4.6 RSNA authentication in an ESS <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
88<\/td>\n8.4.6.1 Preauthentication and RSNA key management <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
89<\/td>\n8.4.6.2 Cached PMKSAs and RSNA key management
8.4.7 RSNA authentication in an IBSS <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
90<\/td>\n8.4.8 RSNA key management in an ESS <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
91<\/td>\n8.4.9 RSNA key management in an IBSS
8.4.10 RSNA security association termination <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
92<\/td>\n8.5 Keys and key distribution
8.5.1 Key hierarchy <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
93<\/td>\n8.5.1.1 PRF <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
94<\/td>\n8.5.1.2 Pairwise key hierarchy
Figure 43s- Pairwise key hierarchy <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
95<\/td>\n8.5.1.3 Group key hierarchy <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
96<\/td>\n8.5.2 EAPOL-Key frames
Figure 43t- Group key hierarchy (informative) <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
97<\/td>\nFigure 43u- EAPOL-Key frame
Figure 43v- Key Information bit layout <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
99<\/td>\nTable 20f- Cipher suite key lengths <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
100<\/td>\nFigure 43w- KDE format
Table 20g- Key RSC field
Table 20h- KDE <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
101<\/td>\nFigure 43x- GTK KDE format
Figure 43y- STAKey KDE format
Figure 43z- MAC address KDE format <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
102<\/td>\nFigure 43aa- PMKID KDE format <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
103<\/td>\n8.5.2.1 STAKey Handshake for STA-to-STA link security
8.5.2.2 EAPOL-Key frame notation <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
104<\/td>\n8.5.3 4-Way Handshake
Figure 43ab- STAKey message exchange <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
105<\/td>\n8.5.3.1 4-Way Handshake Message 1 <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
106<\/td>\n8.5.3.2 4-Way Handshake Message 2
8.5.3.3 4-Way Handshake Message 3 <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
108<\/td>\n8.5.3.4 4-Way Handshake Message 4
8.5.3.5 4-Way Handshake implementation considerations <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
109<\/td>\n8.5.3.6 Sample 4-Way Handshake (informative)
Figure 43ac- Sample 4-Way Handshake <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
110<\/td>\n8.5.3.7 4-Way Handshake analysis (informative) <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
111<\/td>\n8.5.4 Group Key Handshake <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
112<\/td>\n8.5.4.1 Group Key Handshake Message 1 <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
113<\/td>\n8.5.4.2 Group Key Handshake Message 2
8.5.4.3 Group Key Handshake implementation considerations
8.5.4.4 Sample Group Key Handshake (informative) <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
114<\/td>\n8.5.5 STAKey Handshake
Figure 43ad- Sample Group Key Handshake <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
115<\/td>\n8.5.5.1 STAKey Request message
8.5.5.2 STAKey Message 1 <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
116<\/td>\n8.5.5.3 STAKey Message 2
8.5.5.4 STAKey Message 1 and Message 2 to the initiating STA <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
117<\/td>\n8.5.6 RSNA Supplicant key management state machine
8.5.6.1 Supplicant state machine states
Figure 43ae- RSNA Supplicant key management state machine <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
118<\/td>\n8.5.6.2 Supplicant state machine variables
8.5.6.3 Supplicant state machine procedures <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
121<\/td>\n8.5.7 RSNA Authenticator key management state machine <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
122<\/td>\nFigure 43af- Authenticator state machines, part 1 <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
123<\/td>\nFigure 43ag- Authenticator state machines, part 2
Figure 43ah- Authenticator state machines, part 3 <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
124<\/td>\n8.5.7.1 Authenticator state machine states
8.5.7.1.1 Authenticator state machine: 4-Way Handshake (per STA)
Figure 43ai- Authenticator state machines, part 4 <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
125<\/td>\n8.5.7.1.2 Authenticator state machine: Group Key Handshake (per STA)
8.5.7.1.3 Authenticator state machine: Group Key Handshake (global)
8.5.7.2 Authenticator state machine variables <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
127<\/td>\n8.5.7.3 Authenticator state machine procedures
8.5.8 Nonce generation (informative)
8.6 Mapping EAPOL keys to IEEE 802.11 keys
8.6.1 Mapping PTK to TKIP keys
8.6.2 Mapping GTK to TKIP keys <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
128<\/td>\n8.6.3 Mapping PTK to CCMP keys
8.6.4 Mapping GTK to CCMP keys
8.6.5 Mapping GTK to WEP-40 keys
8.6.6 Mapping GTK to WEP-104 keys
8.7 Per-frame pseudo-code
8.7.1 WEP frame pseudo-code <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
130<\/td>\n8.7.2 RSNA frame pseudo-code
8.7.2.1 Per-MSDU Tx pseudo-code <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
131<\/td>\n8.7.2.2 Per-MPDU Tx pseudo-code
8.7.2.3 Per-MPDU Rx pseudo-code <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
132<\/td>\n8.7.2.4 Per-MSDU Rx pseudo-code <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
133<\/td>\n10. Layer management
10.3 MLME SAP interface
10.3.2 Scan
10.3.2.2 MLME-SCAN.confirm
10.3.2.2.2 Semantics of the service primitive
10.3.6 Associate
10.3.6.1 MLME-ASSOCIATE.request
10.3.6.1.2 Semantics of the service primitive
10.3.6.3 MLME-ASSOCIATE.indication
10.3.6.3.2 Semantics of the service primitive <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
134<\/td>\n10.3.7 Reassociate
10.3.7.1 MLME-REASSOCIATE.request
10.3.7.1.2 Semantics of the service primitive
10.3.7.3 MLME-REASSOCIATE.indication
10.3.7.3.2 Semantics of the service primitive <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
135<\/td>\n10.3.17 SetKeys
10.3.17.1 MLME-SETKEYS.request
10.3.17.1.1 Function
10.3.17.1.2 Semantics of the service primitive <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
136<\/td>\n10.3.17.1.3 When generated
10.3.17.1.4 Effect of receipt
10.3.17.2 MLME-SETKEYS.confirm
10.3.17.2.1 Function
10.3.17.2.2 Semantics of the service primitive
10.3.17.2.3 When generated
10.3.17.2.4 Effect of receipt
10.3.18 DeleteKeys
10.3.18.1 MLME-DELETEKEYS.request
10.3.18.1.1 Function
10.3.18.1.2 Semantics of the service primitive <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
137<\/td>\n10.3.18.1.3 When generated
10.3.18.1.4 Effect of receipt
10.3.18.2 MLME-DELETEKEYS.confirm
10.3.18.2.1 Function
10.3.18.2.2 Semantics of the service primitive
10.3.18.2.3 When generated
10.3.18.2.4 Effect of receipt
10.3.19 MIC (Michael) failure event
10.3.19.1 MLME-MICHAELMICFAILURE.indication
10.3.19.1.1 Function <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
138<\/td>\n10.3.19.1.2 Semantics of the service primitive
10.3.19.1.3 When generated
10.3.19.1.4 Effect of receipt
10.3.20 EAPOL
10.3.20.1 MLME-EAPOL.request
10.3.20.1.1 Function
10.3.20.1.2 Semantics of the service primitive <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
139<\/td>\n10.3.20.1.3 When generated
10.3.20.1.4 Effect of receipt
10.3.20.2 MLME-EAPOL.confirm
10.3.20.2.1 Function
10.3.20.2.2 Semantics of the service primitive
10.3.20.2.3 When generated
10.3.20.2.4 Effect of receipt <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
140<\/td>\n10.3.21 MLME-STAKEYESTABLISHED
10.3.21.1 MLME-STAKEYESTABLISHED.indication
10.3.21.1.1 Function
10.3.21.1.2 Semantics of the service primitive
10.3.21.1.3 When generated
10.3.21.1.4 Effect of receipt
10.3.22 SetProtection
10.3.22.1 MLME-SETPROTECTION.request
10.3.22.1.1 Function
10.3.22.1.2 Semantics of the service primitive <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
141<\/td>\n10.3.22.1.3 When generated
10.3.22.1.4 Effect of receipt
10.3.22.2 MLME-SETPROTECTION.confirm
10.3.22.2.1 Function
10.3.22.2.2 Semantics of the service primitive
10.3.22.2.3 When generated <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
142<\/td>\n10.3.22.2.4 Effect of receipt
10.3.23 MLME-PROTECTEDFRAMEDROPPED
10.3.23.1 MLME- PROTECTEDFRAMEDROPPED.indication
10.3.23.1.1 Function
10.3.23.1.2 Semantics of the service primitive
10.3.23.1.3 When generated
10.3.23.1.4 Effect of receipt
11. MAC sublayer management entity
11.3 Association and reassociation <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
143<\/td>\n11.3.1 Authentication-originating STA
11.3.2 Authentication-destination STA
11.3.3 Deauthentication-originating STA
11.3.4 Deauthentication-destination STA <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
144<\/td>\n11.4 Association, reassociation, and disassociation
11.4.1 STA association procedures
11.4.2 AP association procedures <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
145<\/td>\n11.4.3 STA reassociation procedures
11.4.4 AP reassociation procedures <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
146<\/td>\n11.4.5 STA disassociation procedures
11.4.6 AP disassociation procedures <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
147<\/td>\nAnnex A (informative) Protocol Implementation Conformance Statements (PICS)
A.4 PICS proforma-IEEE Std 802.11, 1999 Edition
A.4.4 MAC protocol <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
149<\/td>\nAnnex C (normative) Formal description of MAC operation
C.3 State machines for MAC stations
C.4 State machines for MAC AP <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
150<\/td>\nAnnex D (normative) ASN.1 encoding of the MAC and PHY MIB <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
166<\/td>\nAnnex E (informative) Bibliography
E.1 General <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
167<\/td>\nAnnex H (informative) RSNA reference implementations and test vectors
H.1 TKIP temporal key mixing function reference implementation and test vector <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
175<\/td>\nH.1.1 Test vectors <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
176<\/td>\nH.2 Michael reference implementation and test vectors
H.2.1 Michael test vectors <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
177<\/td>\nH.2.2 Sample code for Michael
Table H.1- Test vectors for block function
Table H.2- Test vectors for Michael <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
183<\/td>\nH.3 PRF reference implementation and test vectors
H.3.1 PRF reference code <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
184<\/td>\nH.3.2 PRF test vectors
H.4 Suggested pass-phrase-to-PSK mapping
H.4.1 Introduction <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
185<\/td>\nH.4.2 Reference implementation <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
186<\/td>\nH.4.3 Test vectors
H.5 Suggestions for random number generation <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
187<\/td>\nH.5.1 Software sampling <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
188<\/td>\nH.5.2 Hardware-assisted solution
Figure H.1- Randomness generating circuit <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
189<\/td>\nH.6 Additional test vectors
H.6.1 Notation
H.6.2 WEP encapsulation
Table H.3- Notation example
Table H.4- Sample plaintext MPDU <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
190<\/td>\nH.6.3 TKIP test vector
Table H.5- RC4 encryption
Table H.6- Expanded MPDU after WEP encapsulation
Table H.7- Sample TKIP parameters <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
191<\/td>\nH.6.4 CCMP test vector
Table H.8- Sample plaintext and ciphertext MPDUs, using parameter from Table H.7 <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
192<\/td>\nH.6.5 PRF test vectors
Table H.9- RSN PRF Test Vector 1
Table H.10- RSN PRF Test Vector 2 <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
193<\/td>\nH.7 Key hierarchy test vectors
H.7.1 Pairwise key derivation
Table H.11- RSN PRF Test Vector 3
Table H.12- RSN PRF Test Vector 4
Table H.13- Sample values for pairwise key derivations <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
194<\/td>\nTable H.14- Sample derived TKIP temporal key (TK)
Table H.15- Sample derived PTK <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
195<\/td>\nAnnex I (normative) Patents <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

ISO\/IEC\/IEEE International Standard – Information technology – Telecommunications and information exchange between systems- Local and metropolitan area networks- Specific requirements Part 11: Wireless LAN Medium Access Control (MAC) and Physical Layer (PHY) specifications – Amendment 6: Medium Access Control(MAC) Security Enhancements<\/b><\/p>\n\n\n\n\n
Published By<\/td>\nPublication Date<\/td>\nNumber of Pages<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
IEEE<\/b><\/a><\/td>\n2006<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n","protected":false},"featured_media":397324,"template":"","meta":{"rank_math_lock_modified_date":false,"ep_exclude_from_search":false},"product_cat":[2644],"product_tag":[],"class_list":{"0":"post-397317","1":"product","2":"type-product","3":"status-publish","4":"has-post-thumbnail","6":"product_cat-ieee","8":"first","9":"instock","10":"sold-individually","11":"shipping-taxable","12":"purchasable","13":"product-type-simple"},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/pdfstandards.shop\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/product\/397317","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/pdfstandards.shop\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/product"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/pdfstandards.shop\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/product"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pdfstandards.shop\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/397324"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/pdfstandards.shop\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=397317"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"product_cat","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pdfstandards.shop\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/product_cat?post=397317"},{"taxonomy":"product_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pdfstandards.shop\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/product_tag?post=397317"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}