{"id":417539,"date":"2024-10-20T06:16:31","date_gmt":"2024-10-20T06:16:31","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/pdfstandards.shop\/product\/uncategorized\/bs-en-16590-22014-2\/"},"modified":"2024-10-26T11:41:16","modified_gmt":"2024-10-26T11:41:16","slug":"bs-en-16590-22014-2","status":"publish","type":"product","link":"https:\/\/pdfstandards.shop\/product\/publishers\/bsi\/bs-en-16590-22014-2\/","title":{"rendered":"BS EN 16590-2:2014"},"content":{"rendered":"
This part of EN 16590 specifies the concept phase of the development of safety-related parts of control systems (SRP\/CS) on tractors used in agriculture and forestry, and on self-propelled ride-on machines and mounted, semi-mounted and trailed machines used in agriculture. It can also be applied to municipal equipment (e.g. street-sweeping machines). It specifies the characteristics and categories required of SRP\/CS for carrying out their safety functions.<\/p>\n
This part of EN 16590 is applicable to the safety-related parts of electrical\/electronic\/programmable electronic systems (E\/E\/PES), as these relate to mechatronic systems. It does not specify which safety functions, categories or performance levels are to be used for particular machines.<\/p>\n
Machine specific standards (type-C standards) can identify performance levels and\/or categories or they should be determined by the manufacturer of the machine based on risk assessment.<\/p>\n
It is not applicable to non-E\/E\/PES systems (e.g. hydraulic, mechanic or pneumatic).<\/p>\n
PDF Pages<\/th>\n | PDF Title<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
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7<\/td>\n | Foreword <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
8<\/td>\n | Introduction <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
10<\/td>\n | 1 Scope 2 Normative references 3 Terms and definitions 4 Abbreviated terms <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
11<\/td>\n | 5 Concept \u2014 Unit of observation 5.1 Objectives 5.2 Prerequisites 5.3 Requirements 5.3.1 Unit of observation and ambient conditions <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
12<\/td>\n | 5.3.2 Limits of unit of observation and its interfaces with other units of observation 5.3.3 Sources of stress 5.3.4 Additional determinations <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
13<\/td>\n | 5.4 Work products 6 Risk analysis and method description 6.1 Objectives 6.2 Prerequisites 6.3 Requirements 6.3.1 Procedures for preparing a risk analysis 6.3.2 Tasks in risk analysis 6.3.3 Participants in risk analysis 6.3.4 Assessment and classification of a potential harm <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
14<\/td>\n | Table 1 \u2014 Examples of the descriptions of injuries 6.3.5 Assessment of exposure in the situation observed Table 2 \u2014 Exposure to the hazardous event 6.3.6 Assessment of a possible avoidance of harm <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
15<\/td>\n | Table 3 \u2014 Possible avoidance of harm 6.3.7 Selecting the required AgPLr <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
16<\/td>\n | Figure 1 \u2014 Determination of AgPLr <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
17<\/td>\n | 6.4 Work products 7 System design 7.1 Objectives 7.2 Prerequisites 7.3 Requirements 7.3.1 Assignment of AgPL <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
18<\/td>\n | Figure 2 \u2014 Relationship between agricultural performance level, categories, DC, MTTFdC and SRL 7.3.2 Achieving the required AgPLr <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
19<\/td>\n | Figure 3 \u2014 Diagram of combination of safety-related parts 7.3.3 Achievement of the performance level 7.4 Work products <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
20<\/td>\n | Annex A (normative) Designated architectures for SRP\/CS A.1 General A.2 Category B (basic) <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
21<\/td>\n | A.3 Category 1 A.4 Category 2 Figure A.1 \u2014 Designated architecture for category 2 <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
22<\/td>\n | A.5 Category 3 <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
23<\/td>\n | Figure A.2 \u2014 Designated architecture for category 3 <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
24<\/td>\n | A.6 Category 4 Figure A.3 \u2014 Designated architecture for category 4 <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
26<\/td>\n | Annex B (informative) Simplified method to estimate channel MTTFdC B.1 General B.2 Component MTTFd values B.2.1 Determination of component MTTFd values <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
27<\/td>\n | B.2.2 MTTFd for components from B10 B.3 Parts count method <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
28<\/td>\n | Table B.1 \u2014 Example MTTFdC calculation of circuit board B.4 Calculation of symmetric MTTFdC for two-channel architectures <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
29<\/td>\n | Annex C (informative) Determination of diagnostic coverage (DC) C.1 General C.2 Estimation of the required DC Table C.1 \u2014 Electrical subsystems (without micro-controllers) Table C.2 \u2014 Electronic subsystems (with micro-controllers) <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
30<\/td>\n | Table C.3 \u2014 Processing units Table C.4 \u2014 Invariable memory ranges Table C.5 \u2014 Variable memory ranges Table C.6 \u2014 I\/O units and interface (external communication) <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
31<\/td>\n | Table C.7 \u2014 Power supply (applies to system with and without micro-controllers) C.3 Estimation of channel DC Table C.8 \u2014 Estimated DC <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
32<\/td>\n | C.4 Calculation of channel DC C.5 Calculation of DC Table C.9 \u2014 Calculated DC <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
33<\/td>\n | Annex D (informative) Estimates for common-cause failure (CCF) Table D.1 \u2014 Scoring process for measures against CCF <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
34<\/td>\n | Table D.2 \u2014 Quantifying common-cause failure <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
35<\/td>\n | Annex E (informative) Systematic failure E.1 General E.2 Procedure for the control of systematic failures E.3 Procedure for the avoidance of systematic failures <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
38<\/td>\n | Annex F (informative) Characteristics of safety functions F.1 General F.2 Start interlock F.3 Stop function F.4 Manual reset <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
39<\/td>\n | F.5 Start and restart F.6 Response time F.7 Safety-related parameters F.8 External control function F.9 Muting (manual suspension of safety functions) F.10 Operator warning <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
40<\/td>\n | Annex G (informative) Example of a risk analysis G.1 Workflow G.2 Example risk analysis of an electro-hydraulic transmission for a self-propelled working machine (forage harvester) \u2014 Extract from a complete risk analysis G.2.1 System description <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
41<\/td>\n | Figure G.1 \u2014 Principal structure of the drive train G.2.2 Surrounding conditions G.2.3 System states and transitions <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
42<\/td>\n | Figure G.2 \u2014 State flowchart G.2.4 System failures <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
43<\/td>\n | G.3 Assessment G.3.1 System failure \u2014 Stops unintentionally Table G.1 \u2014 System failure \u2014 Stops unintentionally Table G.2 \u2014 Scenario 1 <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
44<\/td>\n | Table G.3 \u2014 Scenario 2 G.3.2 System failure \u2014 Does not move when commanded G.4 Results <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
45<\/td>\n | Annex ZA (informative) Relationship between this European Standard and the Essential Requirements of EU Machinery Directive 2006\/42\/EC <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
46<\/td>\n | Bibliography <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Tractors and machinery for agriculture and forestry. Safety-related parts of control systems – Concept phase<\/b><\/p>\n |