This document is a complementary standard to EN 16803-2 that is intended to assessment of the performances of a GBPT placed in real-life or simulated road environments. This document is instead specifically targeting security attacks such as interferences, jamming, meaconing or spoofing. This document cannot be applied independently from EN 16803-2 that describes in detail the general methodology of the assessment procedure.<\/p>\n
This document provides normative information necessary to replay in the lab standardized scenarios specifically dedicated to security tests applied to GNSS.<\/p>\n
Depending on the case (jamming or spoofing), these scenarios are composed of data sets combining either real life recorded SIS and jamming signals or simulated SIS and spoofing signals. The reason for that will be explained in Clause 6.<\/p>\n
Although a high-level categorization of GNSS attacks is given in Annex A, a comprehensive and detailed categorization of possible GNSS attacks is out of the scope of this document.<\/p>\n
It is not the aim of this document to standardize the record procedure neither to define the specific requirements for the generation of the attack scenarios. The record procedure itself and its quality framework for accredited GNSS-specialized laboratories (Lab-A), with the detailed definition of standardized attack scenarios, will be totally and precisely described in EN 16803-4 (under preparation). The list of attack scenarios will have to be regularly updated considering the evolution of GNSS technologies, emerging threats, and countermeasures.<\/p>\n
| PDF Pages<\/th>\n | PDF Title<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2<\/td>\n | undefined <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 9<\/td>\n | 1 Scope 2 Normative references <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 10<\/td>\n | 3 Terms, definitions and acronyms 3.1 Terms and definitions <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 12<\/td>\n | 3.2 Acronyms <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 13<\/td>\n | 4 Description of the general logic of security tests 4.1 Record and Replay principle <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 14<\/td>\n | 4.2 Specificity of security tests based upon the R & R approach 4.3 Jamming testing Architecture <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 16<\/td>\n | 4.4 Spoofing\/meaconing testing architecture <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 18<\/td>\n | 5 Definition of the metrics with respect to security performances 5.1 General 5.2 Accuracy metrics <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 19<\/td>\n | 5.3 Availability and continuity metrics <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 20<\/td>\n | 5.4 Integrity metrics 5.4.1 Protection Level performance metrics <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 21<\/td>\n | 5.4.2 Misleading Information metrics 5.5 Timing metrics 5.5.1 Timestamp resolution 5.5.2 Nominal output latency 5.5.3 Nominal output rate 5.5.4 Output latency stability <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 22<\/td>\n | 5.5.5 Output rate stability 5.5.6 Time to first fix <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 23<\/td>\n | 6 Description of the test procedures and the test equipment 6.1 Scope 6.2 Setting-up of the replay test-bench 6.2.1 Replay device calibration <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 26<\/td>\n | 6.2.2 Replay testbed architecture <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 27<\/td>\n | 6.3 Validation of the data processing HW and SW by the RF test laboratory <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 28<\/td>\n | 6.4 Replaying of the data 6.4.1 General 6.4.2 Jamming scenarios 6.4.3 Spoofing and meaconing scenarios <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 29<\/td>\n | 6.5 Computation of metrics degradation 6.5.1 General 6.5.2 Jamming scenarios <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 30<\/td>\n | 6.5.3 Spoofing and meaconing scenarios 6.6 Establishment of the final test report 7 Validation procedure 8 Definition of the synthesis report: how to report the results of the tests <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 38<\/td>\n | Annex A (informative)Analysis of the GNSS attacks taxonomy A.1 General A.2 Categorization of GNSS attacks <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 39<\/td>\n | A.3 GNSS attack models A.3.1 General A.3.2 Interference and jamming attacks <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 40<\/td>\n | A.3.3 Meaconing attacks A.3.4 Spoofing attacks <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 42<\/td>\n | Annex B (informative)Security-specific metrics (authentication capabilities, spoofing and jamming detection flags, etc.) <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 44<\/td>\n | Annex C (informative)Scenarios proposition C.1 General C.2 Jamming\/interference proposed scenarios <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 45<\/td>\n | C.3 Spoofing proposed scenario <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 48<\/td>\n | C.4 Meaconing proposed scenarios <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 50<\/td>\n | Annex D (informative)Spoofing insights D.1 General <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 51<\/td>\n | D.2 Range error impact D.3 Oscillator error impact <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 52<\/td>\n | D.4 Propagation channel <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 54<\/td>\n | Annex E (informative)Data set record testbed E.1 General E.2 Jamming data generation <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 58<\/td>\n | E.3 Spoofing data recording <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Space. Use of GNSS-based positioning for road Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS) – Assessment of security performances of GNSS-based positioning terminals<\/b><\/p>\n |