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IEEE 802.11i-2004

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IEEE Standard for information technology-Telecommunications and information exchange between systems-Local and metropolitan area networks-Specific requirements-Part 11: Wireless LAN Medium Access Control (MAC) and Physical Layer (PHY) specifications: Amendment 6: Medium Access Control (MAC) Security Enhancements

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IEEE 2004
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Amendment Standard – Superseded. This amendment defines security mechanisms for IEEE 802.11. It includes a definition of WEP for backward compatibility with the original standard, IEEE Std 802.11, 1999 Edition. It defines TKIP and CCMP, which provide more robust data protection mechanisms than WEP affords. This amendment introduces the concept of a security association into IEEE 802.11, and defines security association management protocols called the 4-Way Handshake and the Group Key Handshake. Finally, it specifies how IEEE 802.1X may be utilized by IEEE 802.11 LANs to effect authentication.

PDF Catalog

PDF Pages PDF Title
1 Cover
2 Local and Metropolitan Area Networks—Specific requirements—Part 11: Wireless LAN Medium Access Control (MAC) and Physical Lay
5 Introduction
Participants
11 Contents
16 1. Overview
1.2 Purpose
17 2. Normative references
3. Definitions
21 4. Abbreviations and acronyms
23 5. General description
5.1 General description of the architecture
5.1.1 How wireless LAN systems are different
5.1.1.4 Interaction with other IEEE 802® layers
5.1.1.5 Interaction with non-IEEE 802 protocols
5.2 Components of the IEEE 802.11 architecture
5.2.2 Distribution system (DS) concepts
5.2.2.2 RSNA
24 5.3 Logical service interfaces
5.3.1 Station service (SS)
5.4 Overview of the services
5.4.2 Services that support the distribution service
5.4.2.2 Association
5.4.2.3 Reassociation
5.4.3 Access control and confidentiality controlservices
25 5.4.3.1 Authentication
26 5.4.3.2 Deauthentication
5.4.3.3 PrivacyConfidentiality
27 5.4.3.4 Key management
5.4.3.5 Data origin authenticity
5.4.3.6 Replay detection
5.6 Differences between ESS and IBSS LANs
28 5.7 Message information contents that support the services
5.7.5 PrivacyConfidentiality
5.7.6 Authentication
5.7.7 Deauthentication
5.8 Reference model
Figure 11- Portion of the ISO/IEC basic reference model covered in this standard
29 5.9 IEEE 802.11 and IEEE 802.1X
5.9.1 IEEE 802.11 usage of IEEE 802.1X
5.9.2 Infrastructure functional model overview
5.9.2.1 AKM operations with AS
30 Figure 11a- Establishing the IEEE 802.11 association
Figure 11b- IEEE 802.1X EAP authentication
31 Figure 11c- Establishing pairwise and group keys
32 5.9.2.2 Operations with PSK
5.9.3 IBSS functional model description
5.9.3.1 Key usage
5.9.3.2 Sample IBSS 4-Way Handshakes
Figure 11d- Delivery of subsequent group keys
33 Figure 11e- Sample 4-Way Handshakes in an IBSS
34 5.9.3.3 IBSS IEEE 802.1X Example
5.9.4 Authenticator-to-AS protocol
35 5.9.5 PMKSA caching
6. MAC service definition
6.1 Overview of MAC services
6.1.2 Security services
Figure 11f- Example using IEEE 802.1X authentication
36 6.1.4 MAC data service architecture
37 7. Frame formats
7.1 MAC frame formats
7.1.3 Frame fields
7.1.3.1 Frame Control field
Figure 11g- MAC data plane architecture
38 7.1.3.1.9 WEPProtected Frame field
7.2 Format of individual frame types
7.2.2 Data frames
7.2.3 Management frames
7.2.3.1 Beacon frame format
Figure 13- Frame Control field
Table 5- Beacon frame body
39 7.2.3.4 Association Request frame format
7.2.3.6 Reassociation Request frame format
7.2.3.9 Probe Response frame format
7.2.3.10 Authentication frame format
Table 7- Association Request frame body
Table 9- Reassociation Request frame body
Table 12- Probe Response frame body
40 7.3 Management frame body components
7.3.1 Fixed fields
7.3.1.4 Capability Information field
7.3.1.7 Reason Code field
Table 18- Reason codes
41 7.3.1.9 Status Code field
7.3.2 Information elements
Table 19- Status codes
Table 20- Element IDs
42 7.3.2.25 RSN information element
Figure 46ta- RSN information element format
43 7.3.2.25.1 Cipher suites
Figure 46tb- Suite selector format
Table 20da- Cipher suite selectors
44 7.3.2.25.2 AKM suites
Table 20db- Cipher suite usage
45 7.3.2.25.3 RSN capabilities
Figure 46tc- RSN Capabilities field format
Table 20dc- AKM suite selectors
46 7.3.2.25.4 PMKID
Table 20dd- PTKSA/GTKSA/STAKeySA replay counters usage
47 8. Security
8.1 Framework
8.1.1 Security methods
8.1.2 RSNA equipment and RSNA capabilities
8.1.3 RSNA establishment
49 8.1.4 RSNA assumptions and constraints (informative)
8.2 Pre-RSNA security methods
50 8.2.1 Wired equivalent privacy (WEP)
8.2.1.1 WEP overview
8.2.1.2 WEP MPDU format
Figure 43- Construction of expanded WEP MPDU
51 8.2.1.3 WEP state
8.2.1.4 WEP procedures
8.2.1.4.1 WEP ICV algorithm
8.2.1.4.2 WEP encryption algorithm
8.2.1.4.3 WEP seed construction
52 8.2.1.4.4 WEP MPDU encapsulation
8.2.1.4.5 WEP MPDU decapsulation
Figure 43a- WEP encapsulation block diagram
53 8.2.2 Pre-RSNA authentication
8.2.2.1 Overview
8.2.2.2 Open System authentication
8.2.2.2.1 Open System authentication (first frame)
Figure 43b- WEP decapsulation block diagram
54 8.2.2.2.2 Open System authentication (final frame)
8.2.2.3 Shared Key authentication
8.2.2.3.1 Shared Key authentication (first frame)
55 8.2.2.3.2 Shared Key authentication (second frame)
8.2.2.3.3 Shared Key authentication (third frame)
8.2.2.3.4 Shared Key authentication (final frame)
56 8.2.2.3.5 Shared key MIB attributes
58 8.3 RSNA data confidentiality protocols
8.3.1 Overview
8.3.2 Temporal Key Integrity Protocol (TKIP)
8.3.2.1 TKIP overview
8.3.2.1.1 TKIP encapsulation
59 8.3.2.1.2 TKIP decapsulation
Figure 43c- TKIP encapsulation block diagram
60 8.3.2.2 TKIP MPDU formats
Figure 43d- TKIP decapsulation block diagram
Figure 43e- Construction of expanded TKIP MPDU
61 8.3.2.3 TKIP MIC
8.3.2.3.1 Motivation for the TKIP MIC
62 Figure 43f- TKIP MIC relation to IEEE 802.11 processing (informative)
Figure 43g- TKIP MIC processing format
63 8.3.2.3.2 Definition of the TKIP MIC
Figure 43h- Michael message processing
64 8.3.2.4 TKIP countermeasures procedures
Figure 43i- Michael block function
65 8.3.2.4.1 TKIP countermeasures for an Authenticator
66 8.3.2.4.2 TKIP countermeasures for a Supplicant
Figure 43j- Authenticator MIC countermeasures
67 8.3.2.5 TKIP mixing function
8.3.2.5.1 S-Box
Figure 43k- Supplicant MIC countermeasures
69 8.3.2.5.2 Phase 1 Definition (Figure 43l)
Figure 43l- Phase 1 key mixing
70 8.3.2.5.3 Phase 2 definition (see Figure 43m)
71 8.3.2.6 TKIP replay protection procedures
Figure 43m- Phase 2 key mixing
72 8.3.3 CTR with CBC-MAC Protocol (CCMP)
8.3.3.1 CCMP overview
8.3.3.2 CCMP MPDU format
73 8.3.3.3 CCMP encapsulation
Figure 43n- Expanded CCMP MPDU
Figure 43o- CCMP encapsulation block diagram
74 8.3.3.3.1 PN processing
8.3.3.3.2 Construct AAD
8.3.3.3.3 Construct CCM nonce
Figure 43p- AAD construction
75 8.3.3.3.4 Construct CCMP header
8.3.3.3.5 CCM originator processing
8.3.3.4 CCMP decapsulation
Figure 43q- Nonce construction
76 8.3.3.4.1 CCM recipient processing
Figure 43r- CCMP decapsulation block diagram
77 8.3.3.4.2 Decrypted CCMP MPDU
8.3.3.4.3 PN and replay detection
8.4 RSNA security association management
8.4.1 Security associations
8.4.1.1 Security association definitions
78 8.4.1.1.1 PMKSA
8.4.1.1.2 PTKSA
8.4.1.1.3 GTKSA
79 8.4.1.1.4 STAKeySA
8.4.1.2 Security association life cycle
8.4.1.2.1 Security association in an ESS
80 8.4.1.2.2 Security association in an IBSS
81 8.4.2 RSNA selection
8.4.3 RSNA policy selection in an ESS
82 8.4.3.1 TSN policy selection in an ESS
8.4.4 RSNA policy selection in an IBSS
83 8.4.4.1 TSN policy selection in an IBSS
8.4.5 RSN management of the IEEE 802.1X Controlled Port
8.4.6 RSNA authentication in an ESS
84 8.4.6.1 Preauthentication and RSNA key management
85 8.4.6.2 Cached PMKSAs and RSNA key management
8.4.7 RSNA authentication in an IBSS
86 8.4.8 RSNA key management in an ESS
87 8.4.9 RSNA key management in an IBSS
8.4.10 RSNA security association termination
88 8.5 Keys and key distribution
8.5.1 Key hierarchy
89 8.5.1.1 PRF
90 8.5.1.2 Pairwise key hierarchy
Figure 43s- Pairwise key hierarchy
91 8.5.1.3 Group key hierarchy
92 8.5.2 EAPOL-Key frames
Figure 43t- Group key hierarchy (informative)
93 Figure 43u- EAPOL-Key frame
Figure 43v- Key Information bit layout
95 Table 20f- Cipher suite key lengths
96 Figure 43w- KDE format
Table 20g- Key RSC field
Table 20h- KDE
97 Figure 43x- GTK KDE format
Figure 43y- STAKey KDE format
Figure 43z- MAC address KDE format
98 Figure 43aa- PMKID KDE format
99 8.5.2.1 STAKey Handshake for STA-to-STA link security
8.5.2.2 EAPOL-Key frame notation
100 8.5.3 4-Way Handshake
Figure 43ab- STAKey message exchange
101 8.5.3.1 4-Way Handshake Message 1
102 8.5.3.2 4-Way Handshake Message 2
8.5.3.3 4-Way Handshake Message 3
104 8.5.3.4 4-Way Handshake Message 4
8.5.3.5 4-Way Handshake implementation considerations
105 8.5.3.6 Sample 4-Way Handshake (informative)
Figure 43ac- Sample 4-Way Handshake
106 8.5.3.7 4-Way Handshake analysis (informative)
107 8.5.4 Group Key Handshake
108 8.5.4.1 Group Key Handshake Message 1
109 8.5.4.2 Group Key Handshake Message 2
8.5.4.3 Group Key Handshake implementation considerations
8.5.4.4 Sample Group Key Handshake (informative)
110 8.5.5 STAKey Handshake
Figure 43ad- Sample Group Key Handshake
111 8.5.5.1 STAKey Request message
8.5.5.2 STAKey Message 1
112 8.5.5.3 STAKey Message 2
8.5.5.4 STAKey Message 1 and Message 2 to the initiating STA
113 8.5.6 RSNA Supplicant key management state machine
8.5.6.1 Supplicant state machine states
Figure 43ae- RSNA Supplicant key management state machine
114 8.5.6.2 Supplicant state machine variables
8.5.6.3 Supplicant state machine procedures
117 8.5.7 RSNA Authenticator key management state machine
118 Figure 43af- Authenticator state machines, part 1
119 Figure 43ag- Authenticator state machines, part 2
Figure 43ah- Authenticator state machines, part 3
120 8.5.7.1 Authenticator state machine states
8.5.7.1.1 Authenticator state machine: 4-Way Handshake (per STA)
Figure 43ai- Authenticator state machines, part 4
121 8.5.7.1.2 Authenticator state machine: Group Key Handshake (per STA)
8.5.7.1.3 Authenticator state machine: Group Key Handshake (global)
8.5.7.2 Authenticator state machine variables
123 8.5.7.3 Authenticator state machine procedures
8.5.8 Nonce generation (informative)
8.6 Mapping EAPOL keys to IEEE 802.11 keys
8.6.1 Mapping PTK to TKIP keys
8.6.2 Mapping GTK to TKIP keys
124 8.6.3 Mapping PTK to CCMP keys
8.6.4 Mapping GTK to CCMP keys
8.6.5 Mapping GTK to WEP-40 keys
8.6.6 Mapping GTK to WEP-104 keys
8.7 Per-frame pseudo-code
8.7.1 WEP frame pseudo-code
126 8.7.2 RSNA frame pseudo-code
8.7.2.1 Per-MSDU Tx pseudo-code
127 8.7.2.2 Per-MPDU Tx pseudo-code
8.7.2.3 Per-MPDU Rx pseudo-code
128 8.7.2.4 Per-MSDU Rx pseudo-code
129 10. Layer management
10.3 MLME SAP interface
10.3.2 Scan
10.3.2.2 MLME-SCAN.confirm
10.3.2.2.2 Semantics of the service primitive
10.3.6 Associate
10.3.6.1 MLME-ASSOCIATE.request
10.3.6.1.2 Semantics of the service primitive
10.3.6.3 MLME-ASSOCIATE.indication
10.3.6.3.2 Semantics of the service primitive
130 10.3.7 Reassociate
10.3.7.1 MLME-REASSOCIATE.request
10.3.7.1.2 Semantics of the service primitive
10.3.7.3 MLME-REASSOCIATE.indication
10.3.7.3.2 Semantics of the service primitive
131 10.3.17 SetKeys
10.3.17.1 MLME-SETKEYS.request
10.3.17.1.1 Function
10.3.17.1.2 Semantics of the service primitive
132 10.3.17.1.3 When generated
10.3.17.1.4 Effect of receipt
10.3.17.2 MLME-SETKEYS.confirm
10.3.17.2.1 Function
10.3.17.2.2 Semantics of the service primitive
10.3.17.2.3 When generated
10.3.17.2.4 Effect of receipt
10.3.18 DeleteKeys
10.3.18.1 MLME-DELETEKEYS.request
10.3.18.1.1 Function
10.3.18.1.2 Semantics of the service primitive
133 10.3.18.1.3 When generated
10.3.18.1.4 Effect of receipt
10.3.18.2 MLME-DELETEKEYS.confirm
10.3.18.2.1 Function
10.3.18.2.2 Semantics of the service primitive
10.3.18.2.3 When generated
10.3.18.2.4 Effect of receipt
10.3.19 MIC (Michael) failure event
10.3.19.1 MLME-MICHAELMICFAILURE.indication
10.3.19.1.1 Function
134 10.3.19.1.2 Semantics of the service primitive
10.3.19.1.3 When generated
10.3.19.1.4 Effect of receipt
10.3.20 EAPOL
10.3.20.1 MLME-EAPOL.request
10.3.20.1.1 Function
10.3.20.1.2 Semantics of the service primitive
135 10.3.20.1.3 When generated
10.3.20.1.4 Effect of receipt
10.3.20.2 MLME-EAPOL.confirm
10.3.20.2.1 Function
10.3.20.2.2 Semantics of the service primitive
10.3.20.2.3 When generated
10.3.20.2.4 Effect of receipt
136 10.3.21 MLME-STAKEYESTABLISHED
10.3.21.1 MLME-STAKEYESTABLISHED.indication
10.3.21.1.1 Function
10.3.21.1.2 Semantics of the service primitive
10.3.21.1.3 When generated
10.3.21.1.4 Effect of receipt
10.3.22 SetProtection
10.3.22.1 MLME-SETPROTECTION.request
10.3.22.1.1 Function
10.3.22.1.2 Semantics of the service primitive
137 10.3.22.1.3 When generated
10.3.22.1.4 Effect of receipt
10.3.22.2 MLME-SETPROTECTION.confirm
10.3.22.2.1 Function
10.3.22.2.2 Semantics of the service primitive
10.3.22.2.3 When generated
138 10.3.22.2.4 Effect of receipt
10.3.23 MLME-PROTECTEDFRAMEDROPPED
10.3.23.1 MLME- PROTECTEDFRAMEDROPPED.indication
10.3.23.1.1 Function
10.3.23.1.2 Semantics of the service primitive
10.3.23.1.3 When generated
10.3.23.1.4 Effect of receipt
11. MAC sublayer management entity
11.3 Association and reassociation
139 11.3.1 Authentication-originating STA
11.3.2 Authentication-destination STA
11.3.3 Deauthentication-originating STA
11.3.4 Deauthentication-destination STA
140 11.4 Association, reassociation, and disassociation
11.4.1 STA association procedures
11.4.2 AP association procedures
141 11.4.3 STA reassociation procedures
11.4.4 AP reassociation procedures
142 11.4.5 STA disassociation procedures
11.4.6 AP disassociation procedures
143 Annex A (informative) Protocol Implementation Conformance Statements (PICS)
A.4 PICS proforma-IEEE Std 802.11, 1999 Edition
A.4.4 MAC protocol
145 Annex C (normative) Formal description of MAC operation
C.3 State machines for MAC stations
C.4 State machines for MAC AP
146 Annex D (normative) ASN.1 encoding of the MAC and PHY MIB
162 Annex E (informative) Bibliography
E.1 General
163 Annex H RSNA reference implementations and test vectors
H.1 TKIP temporal key mixing function reference implementation and test vector
171 H.1.1 Test vectors
172 H.2 Michael reference implementation and test vectors
H.2.1 Michael test vectors
173 H.2.2 Sample code for Michael
Table H.1- Test vectors for block function
Table H.2- Test vectors for Michael
179 H.3 PRF reference implementation and test vectors
H.3.1 PRF reference code
180 H.3.2 PRF test vectors
H.4 Suggested pass-phrase-to-PSK mapping
H.4.1 Introduction
181 H.4.2 Reference implementation
182 H.4.3 Test vectors
H.5 Suggestions for random number generation
183 H.5.1 Software sampling
184 H.5.2 Hardware-assisted solution
Figure H.1- Randomness generating circuit
185 H.6 Additional test vectors
H.6.1 Notation
H.6.2 WEP encapsulation
Table H.3- Notation example
Table H.4- Sample plaintext MPDU
186 H.6.3 TKIP test vector
Table H.5- RC4 encryption
Table H.6- Expanded MPDU after WEP encapsulation
Table H.7- Sample TKIP parameters
187 H.6.4 CCMP test vector
Table H.8- Sample plaintext and ciphertext MPDUs, using parameter from Table H.7
188 H.6.5 PRF test vectors
Table H.9- RSN PRF Test Vector 1
Table H.10- RSN PRF Test Vector 2
189 H.7 Key hierarchy test vectors
H.7.1 Pairwise key derivation
Table H.11- RSN PRF Test Vector 3
Table H.12- RSN PRF Test Vector 4
Table H.13- Sample values for pairwise key derivations
190 Table H.14- Sample derived TKIP temporal key (TK)
Table H.15- Sample derived PTK
IEEE 802.11i-2004
$109.42